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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation concerns the problem of free will. Particularly, it aims to 
shed light on the hierarchical theory of freedom, firstly presented by Harry 
Frankfurt in 1971.  
The preliminary hypothesis of this dissertation is that the problem of free 
will is appropriately understood in the terms suggested by the concept of 
grounding. I articulate the relevant claims about freedom in such terms, and I 
ask consequently what circumstance or condition can make the case that the 
agent is exercising freedom. 
 Following this hypothesis, the goal of this work is to show that a revised 
hierarchical theory of free will constitutes a promising answer to the grounding 
question about freedom. I develop my arguments in support of this claim in 
two steps. 
First, I propose a critique of Frankfurt’s original theory of free will and its 
later developments. The objective of my analysis is to show that Frankfurt’s 
hierarchical theory of free will is ambiguous between different definitions of 
freedom and, hence, between different criteria for grounding freedom. At the 
same time, Frankfurt’s later proposals are not successful in the task of justifying 
free will. As a result, I argue that Frankfurt’s theory of freedom lacks a 
grounding element motivating the ability to exercise free will. 
Secondly, I develop an original hierarchical account of free will. Building 
upon my critique of Frankfurt, my proposal combines the main elements of 
Frankfurt’s original theory (hierarchical levels of desires, identification) with new 
elements from Frankfurt’s late reflection about the psychological structure of 
agents (caring, volitional essence). The main aim of my proposal is to equip a 
hierarchical theory of free will with a new grounding element, the volitional 
identity of the agents. In light of this, I conclude that free will is adequately 
defined as the agent’s wholehearted identification with psychic elements which 
belong to her volitional identity. 
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Introduction 
	
	
	
1 Background  
	
This dissertation concerns the problem of free will. As shown by a huge 
literature, in philosophy ‘free will’ is said in many ways. Depending on its 
definition, free will can require different conditions and explain various and 
diverse intuitions. The main goal of my dissertation is to shed light on one 
particular theory of freedom, the hierarchical theory of free will firstly 
presented in 1971 by Harry Frankfurt. The reason to focus on Frankfurt’s 
account is that I regard it as the most promising account to explain what it 
means to exercise freedom of the will. 
One way to characterize free will is as a kind of ‘ability’ that a person 
possesses and that allows her to choose a particular course of action. In light of 
this characterisation, the problem of free will consists in asking whether we as 
humans do or do not possess such an ability, and how this ability can be 
justified. But what does it mean to choose a course of action? A traditional way 
of understanding this expression is simply the idea that an agent chooses a 
course of action if such an action is the realisation of a volition of hers. In other 
words, in order to choose a course of action, an agent has to have the ability of 
freely doing as she wills (Hobbes 1999 [1654], Locke 1974 [1690], Hume 2007 
[1739-40]). However, such a position seems not to distinguish accurately 
between free action and free will and, in the end, it seems to fail in securing 
either.  
On the one hand, the choice of an agent can be free without guaranteeing 
that the agent performs a free action. Suppose, for example, that I decide to get 
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out of my house this morning. Unbeknownst to me, however, someone has 
locked my front door so that it is impossible for me to get out. In this case, the 
freedom of my choice does not assure that I can carry out a free action as well. 
On the other hand, the fact the agent’s actions are produced by her desires and 
volitions seems in itself not enough to guarantee freedom of the will. An agent’s 
volitions can be the result of brainwashing, compulsion, or addiction. In these 
and similar cases, the action performed by the agent is intuitively not free 
because it does not stem from a free will.  
What is required, then, for the agent to have the ability to choose to act in 
a free and autonomous way? In this dissertation, I will attempt to reply to this 
question by understanding it in the terms suggested by the concept of 
grounding. In recent years, the field of philosophy has witnessed an extensive 
debate about the metaphysical relation of grounding.1 In this thesis, however, 
I will not dwell into this technical debate. For the purposes of understanding 
the problem of free will, I consider the relation of grounding in a broader sense. 
In particular, I understand grounding in the sense suggested by Sartorio: 
	
“grounding” [is a] placeholder for some relation of non-causal, ontological 
dependence between facts in light of which it makes sense to say that 
certain facts are more basic or more fundamental than others, in that those 
other facts obtain because of, or in virtue of, them.  
(Sartorio 2016a, 8) 
	
To ask what grounds freedom of the will, then, means to ask what 
circumstance or condition can make the case that the agent is exercising freedom 
of the will. In other words, when a person is said to choose to act freely, what 
is it that justifies and secures such an ability?  
The aim of this shift of perspective is to contend that when we deal with 
the problem of free will we are not only looking for necessary and sufficient 
conditions to justify it. What we are mainly interested in are elements in virtue 
of which a choice or an action can be said free. In this light, the main question 
about freedom can be described as a question about what is the condition in 
virtue of which an agent’s choice is a free one.2   
																																																						
1. For a general overview of the debate about grounding see, for example, Raven (2015). 
2. This way of understanding the free will problem has been recently proposed by Sartorio 
(2016a). See also Bratman (1996) for a similar characterisation of the problem of freedom. 
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One traditional reply to the question about grounding is that the freedom 
of the agent is grounded in the presence of alterative possibilities available to her. 
Indeed, a natural way to regard an agent as free at a moment in time is in terms 
of her capacity to choose between different courses of action at that time. What 
such an ability assures the agent is a sort of control over her decisions: if an 
agent decides between two opposite alternatives, her control about her decision 
stems from the fact that she was able, at the time of the decision, to choose the 
other alternative instead. Indeed, if there is only one course available to her, 
this means that she is only able to decide one thing, her decision counting as 
compelled instead of free. Such a traditional view of freedom is endorsed by 
many incompatibilists about freedom, but also by some compatibilists.3 
According to such a view, then, the ground of freedom lies in the ability of the 
agent to choose between different alternatives: it is in virtue of such an ability 
that an agent effectively exercises freedom of the will. 
A refusal of the alternative possibilities model was provided by Harry 
Frankfurt with his 1969 paper “Alternate possibilities and moral 
responsibility”. In this paper, Frankfurt introduced a series of mental scenarios 
to show that agents are capable of acting freely and being responsible for what 
they do even if they do not possess different alternatives at the time of the 
action. The following is a typical Frankfurt-case: 
		
Frankfurt scenario. Ann is deliberating about whether to make a certain 
choice. Unbeknownst to her, however, a neuroscientist has been 
monitoring her brain activity. The neuroscientist is now able to predict 
what choice Ann is about to make, and he is also able to manipulate Ann’s 
brain in a way that assures that the outcome of Ann’s deliberation will be 
B. If Ann will not make the choice to B on her own, the neuroscientist will 
intervene and force Ann to B. However, Ann makes the choice to B on her 
own, and the neuroscientist does not intervene in Ann’s process of 
deliberation. 
	
																																																						
3. The alternative-possibilities model is traditionally defended by incompatibilists such as 
van Inwagen (1983) and Ginet (1990). For classical compatibilist defenses, see for example Ayer 
(1954), Davidson (1973), Lehrer (1976), and Lewis (1981). A more recent attempt of defending 
the alternative possibility model in a compatibilist frame is the so called “new 
dispositionalism” (Fara 2008, Smith 2003, and Vihvelin 2004 and 2013). 
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In this scenario, Ann’s choice to B is intuitively made on her own, and, as 
such, Ann is morally responsible for that choice. Crucially, however, at the time 
of the decision Ann did not had the ability to choose to C, instead. Had Ann 
chosen to C, the evil neuroscientist would had intervened to correct her process 
of deliberation and make her choose to B. 
Why, in this scenario, one is led to think that Ann is morally responsible 
for her choice? The reason seems to be that Ann’s process of decision was not 
caused by an external source, e.g. the evil neuroscientist, but by her own desires 
and motivations. In this respect, in the above scenario Ann is in control of her 
own decision to B. In other words, in Frankfurt-cases the agent is free and 
responsible because her choice is produced by the ‘right kind’ of causes, and as 
such she intuitively exercises a form of control on her choice, even if she does 
not have, in practice, alternative possibilities available to her at the moment of 
the decision.  
I would like to suggest to now rephrase the analysis of the above Frankfurt-
scenario in terms of the question of grounding. On this approach, the following 
questions arise: what is it, in the above situation, that makes the case that Ann 
is acting freely? In virtue of what circumstance(s) is she morally responsible for 
her choice? Ann does not effectively have the ability to choose otherwise, 
because the intervention of the evil neuroscientist prevents her from making a 
different decision. For this reason, the ability to do otherwise cannot count as a 
proper ground for freedom. What seems to ground freedom in this case is 
something different.  
In particular, Ann’s decision to B counts as free because of how she actually 
came to make her choice. Since Ann’s choice was motivated by her own desires 
and reasons, it is the actual sequence of events which leads to Ann’s decision 
which can be said to ground freedom and moral responsibility.4 In this respect, 
the presence of the neuroscientist is irrelevant to Ann’s freedom and 
responsibility: since he never interferes with Ann’s decision, he is not 
																																																						
4 Such a position is shared by the advocates of ‘Actual-sequence accounts’ of freedom, such 
as Fisher (1994), Fisher and Ravizza (1998), Sartorio (2007, 2012, 2016a, 2016b). The basic claim 
of these accounts is that the only thing that matters to freedom is the actual sources of the 
agent’s acts, while the presence of alternative in front of the agent is irrelevant to motivate her 
freedom. Such an insight was suggested by the analysis of Frankfurt’s cases, as discussed 
above. For a detailed description of different varieties of Actual-sequence account see Sartorio 
(2016a), chs. 1 and 2 and McKenna (2002). 
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effectively part of the actual process of decision. This seems to explain why Ann 
is in control of her own decision to B, even if she wasn’t able to make a different 
choice. 
One thing to note about Frankfurt-scenarios as the one presented above is 
that they usually mostly refer to what is required to justify moral responsibility 
and not directly to freedom of the will.  As a matter of fact, a common picture 
of responsibility assumes that in order to be responsible, an agent needs to 
satisfy a ‘freedom condition’ and ‘epistemic condition’. According to the 
former, to be responsible for something, the agent must enjoy some sort of 
freedom of will or action. According to the latter, to be responsible for 
something one needs also to be aware of what one does, and of the moral 
implications of what one does. 
Since Frankfurt-scenarios mostly refer to freedom in terms of its relevance 
for moral responsibility - hence addressing the question of what moral 
responsibility is grounded in- Frankfurt’s answer as to what is needed to 
ground freedom of the will itself seems to be less clear. 
 
Frankfurt presented his account of freedom of the will in his 1971 paper 
“Freedom of the will and the concept of a person”. Here, he understands the 
ability to exercise a free will in strict connection with the complex psychological 
structure of agents. On Frankfurt’s view, being a human person is essentially 
linked to the ability to have desires and motives of a second order. To have a 
second-order desire means that one has the ability to want to have or not to 
have certain desires.  
For Frankfurt, having free will is strictly linked to the possession of such 
an ability. Frankfurt claims that when one acts in accordance with a desire that 
she wants to have, she is acting with a free will. On the contrary, when one acts 
on desires which she does not recognize at a higher level of reflection as ‘her 
desires’, she is not acting with free will. In his 1971 essay, Frankfurt firstly 
considers cases in which an agent is driven by motives which she recognizes as 
alien to her motivational structure. The analysis of such cases suggests that 
agents involved in these scenarios - such as, for example, addicts or compulsive 
agents - do not recognize their desires as free or autonomous. In contrast, 
Frankfurt argues, it seems that to be a free and autonomous agent one has to 
Background 
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be directed by motives and desires that she approves and that she wants to be 
part of her motivational structure.  
Accordingly, the core claim of Frankfurt’s account of freedom is that free 
will is strictly dependent on how the agent’s desires are organized when they 
motivate a choice. As with the case of moral responsibility considered in 
Frankfurt (1969), it seems that what counts for freedom of the will is not the 
presence of alternative possibilities available to the agent in the moment of the 
choice. Rather, the will of the agent is free if it is formed by effective desires 
which are brought about ‘in the right way’ in the motivational organization of 
the agent.  
What is, however, such a ‘right way’ and why is it significant for freedom 
of the will? The answer to this question is crucial in order to corroborate 
Frankfurt’s theory of freedom. One way to tentatively reply to this question is 
by rephrasing it again in the terms offered by the notion of grounding. In this 
sense, one can ask in which way the organization of the agent’s desires can 
ground freedom of the will. In other words, how can the motivational structure 
of the agent make it the case that the agent is exercising freedom of the will? 
It seems that for Frankfurt (1971), the right answer to such a question is 
that free will is principally grounded in the hierarchical organization of the will 
and, in particular, in the relation of dependence between lower-order and 
higher-order desires. More specifically, for the will to be free, the lower-order 
efficacious desires of a person have to be in accord with, or in some way 
controlled by, higher-order desires. In light of this, Frankfurt’s first answer is 
that free will is grounded in the role of higher-order volitions in the agent’s 
will. Particularly, Frankfurt’s answer at the time of his 1971 paper is that some 
effective desires are brought about ‘in the right way’ because they are brought 
about by the higher-order volitions that the agent endorses. As a consequence, 
an agent exercises a free will when she is driven by desires which are endorsed 
by herself at a higher level of reflection.  
However, Frankfurt’s (1971) arguments to justify these claims are not 
always univocal. One problem with Frankfurt’s theory is that he is not clear 
about the precise role which is played in this picture by higher-order desires. 
On the one hand, it is not clear whether the higher-order desires must only be 
in accord with or also be a direct cause of the lower order desires, or maybe 
both (Shatz 1985, Sartorio 2016, Beebe 2013). On the other hand, it is not clear if 
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the role that Frankfurt assigns to higher-level desires is successful in this task. 
Indeed, a traditional objection to Frankfurt’s theory is that higher-order desires 
in themselves are nothing special, and the idea that their role in the agent’s 
motivation can ground freedom of the will is simply misleading (Watson 1987, 
Bratman 1996).  
These and other objections led Frankfurt to subsequently reject the view 
that free desires are simply reducible to endorsing higher-order volitions of the 
agent. Much of Frankfurt’s work since 1971 can be interpreted as an attempt to 
provide a different answer to the question of what grounds freedom of the will. 
Starting from Frankfurt (1977), he replies to this question by focusing on the 
notion of identification. Roughly, identification is a psychic process by which the 
agent’s motivational elements, in particular her desires, become in some sense 
‘her own’. Frankfurt now suggests that a desire is free when an agent identifies 
with it. According to such a view, when the agent is moved by desires with 
which she ‘identifies’, her desires are not external to her motivational structure, 
and thus she is exercising a free will. On the contrary, when the desire that 
moves the agent is perceived by the agent as ‘alien’, as one with which she does 
not identify (as, for example, in case of addictions and compulsions), she is not 
driven by a will that is free. This latter notion of identification, however, is also 
threatened by a number of objections. The development of his theory from his 
1977 to his 1992 paper thus aims at revising such a notion in different directions 
in order to meet these objections.5 
For these reasons, Frankfurt’s theory is not clear about what is the element 
which can ground freedom of the will in his account (Bratman 1996 and 2002; 
Watson 1975 and 1987; Sartorio 2016a). Throughout a number of works, 
Frankfurt revised his account of freedom and provided different answers to 
this question (higher-order volitions, identification, satisfaction). The presence of 
different answers in Frankfurt’s account of freedom seems to be a source of 
confusion, when not ambiguity, in Frankfurt’s theory.  
 
In recent years, however, Frankfurt’s reflections have followed a new 
direction as regards to freedom and autonomy. In parallel with the 
development of notions such as caring, love and volitional identity within his 
																																																						
5 See particularly chapter 2, section 2.2 for a discussion of the classical objections to 
Frankfurt’s notion of identification. 
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philosophy of action, Frankfurt now claims that “[a] person acts autonomously 
only when his volitions derive from the essential character of his will” 
(Frankfurt 1982, 132). Such a reflection suggests a different understanding of 
the notion of freedom, connecting it to the notion of volitional essence. The 
agent’s desires are then free when they are ‘essential’ to the subject’s volitional 
identity. The fascinating claim made by Frankfurt is that some of the agent’s 
desires form, in some way, what can be called her volitional essence. Such a 
volitional essence is so powerful that it impedes the agent from identifying 
with desires which are not part of her volitional identity. For the agent to 
identify with some desires and not with others is, indeed, a kind of necessity, a 
volitional necessity. The interesting question Frankfurt raises concerns the way 
in which the idea of a volitional essence is connected with freedom and 
autonomy. 
One of the aims of my dissertation is to provide an answer to this question, 
that is, to motivate the claim that freedom is in some way dependent on the 
agents’ volitional essence. In order to do so, I propose a modified hierarchical 
theory of free will, which revises elements from Frankfurt’s account presented 
in 1971 in light of Frankfurt’s recent works. My intention is to build from 
Frankfurt’s rich description of the psychology of agency in order to derive a 
hierarchical theory of free will. In particular, my account of freedom justifies 
the introduction of volitional identity as a new ground for freedom. Free will, 
in this sense, is understood as the agent’s wholehearted identification with 
psychic elements which belong to her volitional identity.  
	
	
2  Objectives  
	
The main objective of this dissertation is to argue that a revised hierarchical 
theory of free will is a promising answer to the grounding question about 
freedom. I will develop my arguments to support this claim in two steps: 
 
A. First, I propose an analysis of Frankfurt’s original theory of free will 
and its later developments. The objective of my analysis is to show that 
Frankfurt’s original hierarchical theory of free will is ambiguous 
between different definitions of freedom, and that it does not have the 
resources to address some very well-known objections against it. At the 
INTRODUCTION 
	
	
17 
same time, I argue that the later developments of Frankfurt’s account 
of freedom, that are intended as providing a reply to the objections and 
a ground to the theory, are not successful in that task. As a result, I 
argue that Frankfurt’s concept of freedom is left without a secure 
grounding element to explain the ability to exercise free will. 
 
B. Secondly, my objective is to develop a revised hierarchical theory of 
free will. Building upon my analysis of Frankfurt’s account of freedom, 
my account combines the main elements of Frankfurt’s original theory 
(hierarchical levels of desires, identification) with new elements from 
Frankfurt’s late reflection about the psychological structure of agents 
(caring, volitional essence). The main aim of my proposal is to equip a 
hierarchical theory of free will with a different and new grounding 
element, the volitional identity of the agents. 
	
	
3  Thesis Structure 
	
This dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter 1 (Three concepts of free 
will), I discuss Frankfurt’s (1971) theory of free will. I argue that Frankfurt’s 
classical theory of free will grounds freedom not just by appealing to the 
endorsement of higher-order volitions, but by tightening the conditions of 
control of the agent on her desires, so as to ensure that the agent directly controls 
her motivational structure. Such a move aims to show that if a desire is 
internally controlled by the agent’s volitions, then her desires are brought 
about ‘in the right way’ in the motivational organisation of the agent, thus 
counting as free in Frankfurt’s sense of the term. However, I suggest, the 
condition of control that Frankfurt (1971) provides is not univocal, and gives 
rise to three different conceptions of free will. I show that also higher-order 
volitions, even if enhanced with a distinction between three concepts of free 
will, do not work as a grounding for freedom because they are vulnerable to an 
influential objection originally made by Gary Watson (Watson 1975). 
In chapter 2 (Freedom and Identification), I discuss Frankfurt’s claim that 
identification is sufficient to secure freedom. I argue that Frankfurt presents 
two different notions of identification as a way to ground his account of 
freedom. I call them Active Identification and Wholehearted Identification. In a first 
Thesis Structure 
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time, he argues for a notion of active identification with the introduction of the 
concept of decision. In a second time, he rejects this account and argues for a 
notion of wholehearted identification with the introduction of the concept of 
satisfaction. I argue that both such approaches are doomed to failure and that, 
as such, Frankfurt’s notion of identification is unable to act as a ground for a 
hierarchical theory of freedom. 
In chapter 3 (The necessity of freedom), I present a revised hierarchical 
account of free will. The main claim of my proposal is that freedom is 
dependent on the agent’s volitional identity, which acts as a proper ground for 
freedom of the will. First, I motivate the agent’s identification with her desires 
by proposing a different notion of identification, which make use of the notion 
of satisfaction, but it is grounded in the concepts of volitional identity and 
caring. I propose to make use of such a notion of identification to ground a 
hierarchical account of free will. Free will, in this sense, is described as the 
agent’s wholehearted identification with psychic elements which belong to her 
volitional identity. 
Chapter 4 concludes.
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1  
Three concepts of free will 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Outline of the chapter 
 
In this chapter, I discuss Frankfurt’s (1971) theory of free will. I argue that 
Frankfurt’s classical theory of free will grounds freedom not just by appealing 
to the endorsement of higher-order volitions, but by tightening the conditions 
of control that the agent has over her desires, so as to ensure that the agent 
directly controls her motivational structure Such a move aims to show that if a 
desire is internally controlled by the agent’s volitions, then her desires are 
brought about ‘in the right way’ in the motivational organisation of the agent, 
counting as free in Frankfurt’s sense of the term (section 1.3).  However, I 
suggest that the condition of control that Frankfurt (1971) provides is not 
univocal, but rather gives rise to three different definitions of free will and, hence, 
to different criteria for grounding freedom (section 1.4). Distinguishing 
between these three concepts of freedom serves a number of additional 
purposes in this chapter. Specifically, I offer an original formulation of the 
problem of the willing addict (section 1.5). Moreover, I make use of this 
distinction to revisit Watson’s (1975) classical objection to Frankfurt’s theory 
(section 1.7). I conclude that higher-order volitions, even if enhanced with a 
distinction between three concepts of free will, do not work as a grounding for 
freedom because they remain vulnerable to Watson’s objection (section 1.7). 
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1.2 Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory of free will 
 
Frankfurt’s (1971) paper “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person” presents an original account of free will. This account is tightly related 
to Frankfurt’s own conception of the psychological structure of a person’s 
motivation. In this paper, he also introduces the hierarchical theory of desires, 
which is at the core of his account of human psychology and action. Frankfurt 
(1971) argues that having free will and being a person are significantly tied 
together: in particular, he suggests that free will is the outcome of the specific 
hierarchical organisation of a person’s will.  
The main elements which constitute the will of a person are desires. 
Frankfurt thinks that human beings have a certain motivational complexity, 
and as such their will is formed by desires of different levels. On this account, 
persons possess a primary level of motivation formed by first-order desires. 
First-order desires are desires which have as their objects an action. Frankfurt 
contends that first-order desires can be expressed in statements of the form: 
 
[P] wants to X  
 
where ‘to X’ refers to an action (1971, 13).6 If, for example, I want to go for 
a run, this is a first-order desire of mine. In turn, among first-order desires, 
Frankfurt distinguishes between desires which are effective and those which 
are not. Effective desires are those that are able to move a person, as Frankfurt 
puts it, “all the way to action” (1971, 14). Effective first-order desires primarily 
constitute the will of an agent7. This, however, is a not an exclusive characteristic 
of human persons. On the contrary, other creatures such as many non-human 
																																																						
6 Page numbers are from the reprints of the articles in Frankfurt (1988) and (1999), despite the 
fact that the papers are cited in the original date. 
7 Note that Frankfurt uses the verbs ‘want’ and ‘desire’ as synonyms. Indeed, Frankfurt (1971) 
suggests the following usage: “A wants to X may mean to convey that it is his desire that is 
motivating or moving A to do what he is actually doing or that A will in fact be moved by this 
desire (unless he changes his mind) when he acts” (14). One possible objection to this choice is 
that it does not take into account the difference between mere desires and evaluations. It could 
make sense to say that, for example, though I desire to eat junk food, I do not actually want it 
because I want to live healthily. In this case, the verb ‘want’ seems to be directly related to an 
evaluation made by the person. Because of this, it seems that one can actually fail to want what 
one desires and the other way around (see Watson 1975 for a similar point). 
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animals are able to conduct actions by following effective desires. But if this is 
true, what, if anything, does characterise the organization of a person’s will?  
According to Frankfurt, what characterises the structure of a person’s will 
is the circumstance that she also possesses second-order desires. Such second-
order desires are said to have first-order desires as their objects (1971, 14). For 
example, I can have the desire to desire to get fit and exercise daily, and this 
can result in the desire to have the desire to go for a run. In this case, I want to 
have a first-order desire and, moreover, I want such a desire to be effective, so 
as to move myself all the way down to the action of going out for a run. 
The objects of second-order desires are first-order desires, and I can want 
them to be effective or not: I can simply have a second-order desire for having 
a certain kind of desire without wanting to act on it. For this reason, Frankfurt 
recognises a further distinction among second-order desires. It is possible for 
me to have a second-order desire for a first-order desire, and still do not want 
such a desire to be part of my will. Frankfurt‘s example is very revelatory. He 
imagines a psychotherapist who desires to have a first-order desire to take a 
drug, in order to understand better her patients’ feelings. However, she is very 
resolute in wanting to avoid really taking the drug: what she wants is only to 
feel the desire, without being moved to act by such a desire, and without 
considering such a desire as a part of her will (1971, 9). In more normal cases, 
agents have second-order desires which they want to be effective, which they 
want to be part of their will. As in the previous example, if I have a desire to 
get fit and to go out for a run, in this case I want my desire for a healthy body 
to be completely effective: I want to have a will which includes the desire to 
have a healthy body. Such kind of second-order desires are called by Frankfurt 
second-order volitions. As he explains: 
 
Someone has a desire of the second order either when he wants simply to 
have as certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In 
situations of the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires “second-
order volitions” or “volitions of the second order”. Now it is having 
second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, 
that I regard as essential to being a person.  
(Frankfurt 1971, 16)  
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According to Frankfurt, only persons possess second-order volitions. The 
distinguishing feature of a person’s will, then, is not just the possibility of 
having second-order desires but that of having second-order volitions as well.  
The presence of second-order volitions in a person’s motivation is 
fundamental. Indeed, only persons can have the desire to be moved by desires 
which are different from the ones which actually move them. That is, they can 
want a certain desire to become their will. For this reason, the uniqueness of 
persons can be then traced back to their natural capacity to reflect on themselves 
and on their desires and wants: this means that they are at the same time 
reflective and the object of this reflection (cf. Buss and Overton 2002). Because 
of this capacity, it is possible for persons to find a discrepancy between these 
two dimensions. In other words, it is possible that they find that they have 
desires which they would prefer not to have or manifest, because they would 
like to possess a different will from the one they discover in themselves by the 
process of self-reflection. Such an ability, Frankfurt claims, is the essence of 
being a person, and an individual without it is a ‘wanton’. What is missing in 
a wanton is not, Frankfurt argues, a sort of rationality, but instead the exact 
ability to reflect on her motivational structure and accordingly form higher-
order volitions (Frankfurt 1971, 16).  
Frankfurt’s characterisation of the wanton indicates another crucial aspect 
of his theory. Namely, that which makes persons ‘persons’ lies primarily in the 
structure of the will. What is able to move persons to action is the hierarchical 
structure of their will rather than their rational abilities.8 In Frankfurt’s picture, 
the reasoning ability only has an instrumental value.9 At the same time, being 
a person presupposes rationality: indeed, rational abilities allow a person to be 
critically aware of her own motivational structure by manifesting second-order 
volitions. Accordingly, the structure of a person’s will presupposes that she is 
a rational being (Frankfurt 1971, 17). 
 
Building upon these distinctions, Frankfurt (1971) develops a hierarchical 
theory of freedom. According to Frankfurt, there is a close connection between 
																																																						
8 Frankfurt’s conception of reason is, in this respect, in line with the Humean claim that pure 
reason does not move us, but is instead “the slave of passions”, a merely instrumental ability. 
“Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will,” and reason alone “can never 
oppose passion in the direction of the will” (Hume 1748 [2007], 413). 
9 Frankfurt motivates his view on practical reason in his 2004 book The Reasons of Love. I 
discuss his approach in more detail in chapter 3, section 3.7.  
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the structure of a person’s will and the possession of a distinguishing feature 
of the human condition: the ability to exercise freedom of the will.  
 
In Frankfurt’s words: 
 
It is only because a person has volitions of the second order that he is 
capable both of enjoying and of lacking freedom of the will. The concept 
of a person is not only, then, the concept of a type of entity that has both 
first-order desires and volitions of the second order. It can also be 
construed as the concept of a type of entity for whom the freedom of its 
will may be a problem.  
(Frankfurt 1971, 19) 
 
In this passage, Frankfurt makes two connected remarks. First, being 
capable of having second-order volitions and of being reflective about her will 
is a pre-condition for a person’s ability to enjoy or to lack free will. Secondly, 
and consequently, it is possible to identify persons not only as those entities 
that possess second-order volitions, but also as the type of entities for whom 
enjoying or lacking freedom of the will may be a problem. Indeed, as they lack 
the ability of self-reflection, other kinds of entities, such as non-human animals, 
wantons, and arguably even very young children, do not possess the capacity 
of exercising or not exercising free will. 
To have free will is then, in Frankfurt’s terminology, a capacity which 
involves desires of the second-order, and someone has second-order volitions 
when he wants “a certain desire to be his will”. As compared to the classical 
compatibilist approach, the advantage of this definition of free will is, as 
Frankfurt suggests, that classical compatibilism is only able to account for 
freedom of action but not for freedom of the will. To say that to be free is to be 
able to do what one wants seems to be sufficient condition for freedom of action: 
if one is able to perform, without impediments, a willed action, she is effectively 
doing what she wants, thus enjoying freedom of action. In this case, if nothing 
impedes the relation between the will of an agent and the action she performs, 
then the agent is exercising freedom of action.  
On the other hand, to have free will is, in Frankfurt’s terminology, a 
capacity linked to the higher-level of the self (“The question of the freedom of 
his will does not concern the relation between what he does and what he wants 
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to do. Rather, it concerns his desires themselves”, Frankfurt 1971, 20). Frankfurt 
proposes to understand free will in close analogy with the understanding of 
freedom of action. In this light, it is possible to claim that freedom of the will is 
the freedom of wanting, through second-order volitions, what one wants to 
want. An agent's will is free, then, when nothing impedes the relation between 
volition and will (cf. McKenna 2002). 
Frankfurt recognises at least two possible complexities for his theory. First, 
second-order volitions, as they are desires, can conflict among themselves. But 
in this case, until the conflict is resolved, it would be uncertain whether in 
acting in accord or in conflict with any particular volition an agent is acting of 
her own free will. Secondly, according to Frankfurt, it is possible to imagine 
that a person may have, especially in the case of a conflict between her second-
order volitions, volitions of a still higher order than the second ones (Frankfurt 
1971, 21). The question then becomes what, in such a case, can prevent a person 
from obstinately refusing to identify herself with one of her second-order 
volitions, so as to act with a will that she wants to have. To answer this question, 
Frankfurt introduces the notion of identification, one that he will significantly 
develop in his later writings: 
 
It is possible, however, to terminate such a series of acts without cutting it 
off arbitrarily. When a person identifies himself decisively with one of his 
first-order desires, this commitment "resounds" throughout the potentially 
endless array of higher orders.  
(Frankfurt 1971, 21) 
 
What Frankfurt further requires for justifying freedom of the will is not 
only the fact that the agent satisfies the hierarchical mesh between volition and 
will, but also that she decisively identifies herself with one of her first-order 
desires. In so doing, her will becomes constituted by the volitions aligned with 
her identification, that is, with what at a higher-order of reflection she wants 
her will to be. To enjoy free will, then, is a matter of “satisfaction” of those 
desires with which a person decisively identifies herself, while a lack of such 
identification would entail the absence of a free will. 
In light of the above treatment, Frankfurt (1971) proposes the following 
characterisation of freedom of the will: 
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Freedom of the will: a person possesses freedom of the will if she is free to 
want what she wants to want. 
 
On this formulation, ‘wants’ refers to higher-order desires whose objects 
are the first-order desires with which the agent identifies. 
 
 
1.3 A ground for freedom 
 
In the Introduction, I argued for the opportunity to understand the 
problem of free will in terms suggested by the notion of grounding.10 As 
proposed by Sartorio (2016a), the relation of grounding holds that “it makes 
sense to say that certain facts are more basic… than others, in that those other 
facts obtain because of, or in virtue of, them” (8). In light of this, to ask what 
grounds freedom of the will means to ask what circumstance or condition can 
make the case that the agent is exercising freedom of the will. When a person 
is said to choose to act freely, what is it that justifies and secures such an ability? 
In this section, I ask how hierarchical theories of free will, and particularly 
Frankfurt’s account, are able to reply to this question. I will do so by comparing 
Frankfurt’s theory with classical compatibilist accounts of freedom. 
Classical compatibilist theories of freedom hold that a person acts freely if 
there are no external impairments to her doing what she wants to do (e.g., 
Hobbes 1999 [1654], Locke 1974 [1690], Hume 2007 [1739-40]). For example, if 
a person is in chains or locked in a room, she cannot do what she most wants 
to do, thus she cannot act freely. In contrast, if a person is able to simply act as 
she desires, she is acting freely. According to classical compatibilism such an 
analysis is sufficient to also explain freedom of the will, because ‘freedom’ or 
‘liberty’ can be equally applied to actions or choices: when an agent has no 
impediments to her doing what she wants to do, this implies that her choices 
are as well free, and that she is exercising freedom of the will.11 Such a ‘thin’ 
																																																						
10 See Introduction, section 1, 2-3. 
11 See for example Hume’s definition of freedom, according to which to be free is simply to 
perform actions in line with desires: “[W]hat is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary 
actions? We cannot surely mean that actions have so little connection with motives, 
inclinations, and circumstances that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity 
from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of 
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account of freedom is straightforwardly compatible with determinism, and it 
additionally has the merit of describing freedom of the will by just considering 
ordinary aspects of human agency.  
In more rigorous terms, classical compatibilism requires for freedom of the 
will the fulfilment of two conditions. The first condition is supposed to 
guarantee the self-determination of the agent, and says that if the agent’s 
behaviour is produced by the agent’s wants, beliefs, and desires, then she is 
acting with a free will.  The second condition provides the agent with 
alternative possibilities, and says that if the agent had been motivated 
differently, her behaviour would have been different (cf. Levin 1979, 238).  
In light of this, classical compatibilism grounds freedom in two different 
elements. On the one hand, freedom is justified by the link between the actual 
motivation and the actions of the agent: an agent acts freely if her behaviour is 
directly caused by her desires and wants, without any external impediment. 
On the other hand, freedom for classical compatibilists is grounded in the 
presence of counterfactual alternative possibilities for the agent or, in other 
words, in the connection between the agent’s counterfactual motivation and 
her acts: had the agent been motivated differently, she would have acted in a 
different way. 
Notoriously, such a position presents immediate problems. That the 
agent’s behaviour is produced by her desires and wants does not seem to be 
enough to guarantee freedom, because the agent’s desires themselves can be 
the origin of alienation. In cases of compulsion or addiction, for example, what 
prevents the agent from exercising freedom of the will is exactly the presence, 
in her motivational structure, of ‘wrong’ desires. Indeed, when an addict takes 
a drug, she could do so in accordance with and because of her desire for the 
drug. The addict could also possess alternative possibilities: had she wanted to 
act otherwise, she would have done so. If both of these conditions are 
respected, according to the classical compatibilist such an addict is effectively 
acting freely. It is easy to see that such a conclusion is strongly 
																																																						
the other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only 
mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose 
to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is 
universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no 
subject of dispute” (Hume 1748 [2007], VIII, Part I, 104). 
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counterintuitive.12 It seems, then, that the grounding elements provided by 
compatibilism are not sufficient to secure freedom of the will.  
By contrast, Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory seems to be better equipped to 
deal with these problems. The general strategy adopted by hierarchical theories 
of free will is one of constructing a model of the agent’s motivational 
organisation as composed of different levels of desires.13 In this sense, 
Frankfurt shows that alien desires or intentions (e.g. the desires of an addicted 
agent) are the result of an incorrect mesh between different levels of the 
person’s motivational structure. The analysis of addicts or compulsive agents 
shows that they do not recognise their desires as free or autonomous. In 
contrast, Frankfurt claims, it seems that to be free and autonomous an agent 
has to be directed by motives and desires that she approves and that she wants 
to be part of her motivational structure. Accordingly, for Frankfurt free will is 
strictly dependent on how the agent’s desires are organised when they motivate 
a choice, and not simply on the fact that such desires and wants cause the 
agent’s actions. In this light, the will of the agent is free if it is formed by 
effective desires which are brought about ‘in the right way’ in the motivational 
organisation of the agent.  
In which way, then, does the organisation of the agent’s desires motivate 
freedom of the will in a way which is different from the one offered by classical 
compatibilism? Shatz (1985) suggests that Frankfurt’s overall strategy to deal 
with the classic objections to compatibilism is to tighten the conditions of free 
will so as to “ensure that the agent controls his motivational structure in 
precisely the way that his first-level motivational structure controlled his 
behaviour in the original, unrefined account” (459). More specifically, for the 
will to be free, the lower-order efficacious desires of a person have to be in 
accord, or be in some way controlled by higher-order desires. In this light, 
																																																						
12 The respect of the second condition is in itself strongly problematic in a compatibilist 
scenario, as the vast literature on the subject shows. In this dissertation, I will not discuss this 
condition in detail. Instead, I will limit my arguments to the first condition. On a general note, 
however, it seems that to analyse “I would have done otherwise if I wanted to” in terms of 
choices and desires leads to a regress, because it is always possible to ask the question “But 
could the person have chosen differently?” (cf. Broad 1934, Taylor 1992). In this sense, such an 
analysis seems to lead to an infinite regress of ever higher-order counterfactuals (see Davidson 
1980, 69). 
13 Among hierarchical theories of free will, the most renowned are probably Dworkin (1970); 
Frankfurt (1971), (1975), (1987); Neely (1974); Levin (1979); Lehrer (1980); Watson (1975), (1977); 
and Zimmerman (1981). 
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Frankfurt’s answer is that free will is secured by the role of higher-order 
volitions in the agent’s will.  
In what follows, I argue that such a move allows Frankfurt to define a 
different grounding element for freedom. Indeed, for Frankfurt (1971), free will 
is mostly grounded in the relation of dependence between lower-order and 
higher-order desires. Frankfurt defines a different ground for freedom by 
tightening the conditions of control of the agent on her desires so as to ensure 
that the agent directly controls her motivational structure. Such a move aims to 
show that if a desire is internally controlled by the agent’s volitions, then her 
desires are brought about ‘in the right way’ in the motivational organisation of 
the agent, counting as free in Frankfurt’s sense of the term. However, I suggest 
that the condition of control that Frankfurt (1971) provides is not univocal, but 
rather gives rise to three different definitions of free will and, hence, to different 
criteria for grounding freedom. 
Distinguishing between these three concepts of freedom will serve a 
number of additional purposes later in this chapter. Specifically, such a 
distinction will allow me to offer an original formulation of the problem of the 
willing addict (section 1.5).14 Moreover, I will make use of this distinction to 
revisit Watson’s (1975) classical objection to Frankfurt’s theory (section 1.7). 
 
 
1.4 Three concepts of free will 
 
In this section, I argue that in Frankfurt (1971) the condition of control which 
is supposed to link the agent’s higher-order motivational elements with the 
lower-order ones is not spelled out in a univocal way. I argue that such an 
ambiguity in the definition of a control condition gives rise to three different 
concepts of free will. As a result, I suggest that Frankfurt (1971) also presents 
diverse grounding elements for free will. 
Consider the following passage as an illustration of the different concepts 
of free will I would like to spell out: 
 
																																																						
14 In chapter 3, section 3.8, I offer as well an original solution to the problem of the willing’s 
addict freedom. There, I suggest that the willing addict is only allowed to exercise free will in 
a weaker sense than the one claimed by Frankfurt (1971).  
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Just as the question about the freedom of an agent's action has to do with 
whether it is the action he wants to perform, so the question about the 
freedom of his will has to do with whether it is the will he wants to have. 
It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions, 
then, that a person exercises freedom of the will. And it is in the 
discrepancy between his will and his second-order volitions, or in his 
awareness that their coincidence is not his own doing but only a happy 
chance, that a person who does not have this freedom feels its lack.  
(Frankfurt 1971, 20, my emphasis) 
 
In this passage, Frankfurt describes the conditions under which a person 
does exercise or does not exercise freedom of the will. On the positive case, 
Frankfurt defines free will as a conformity between the will and the second-
order volitions of an agent: if they align, and so the person possesses the will 
she wants to have, she exercises free will. On the negative case, however, he 
seems to assume two alternative circumstances. First, if there is a ‘discrepancy’ 
between the will and the second-order volitions, the person is not exercising 
free will. Secondly, and alternatively, if the will and the second-order volitions 
align, but such alignment is only a ‘happy chance’ and not the person’s own 
doing, the person does not exercise freedom of the will. 
Accordingly, the passage seems to conflate two different concepts of free 
will: 
 
(a) A person possesses free will if an only if she can make her will and 
second-order volitions conform. 
(b) A person possesses free will if and only if her will and her second-order 
volitions conform.15  
 
																																																						
15 Another way to express these two meanings of free will by using Frankfurt’s own 
terminology is as follows:  
 
(a1) A person possesses free will if and only if she is free to want what she wants to want.  
(b1) A person possesses free will if and only if she wants what she wants to want.  
 
Condition (a1) suggests that a person exercises free will only if her will is in itself free, that is, 
if and only if she is free to want something different from the will she already has. Condition 
(b1), on the other hand, suggests that for a person to exercise free will it is sufficient that she 
actually desire in conformity with her will. In chapter 3, section 3.2, I will refer to conditions 
(a1) and (b1) instead of (a) and (b). 
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The difference between these two concepts of free will can be expressed by 
noticing that while (a) suggests that there should be a direct relation between 
higher and lower motivational elements of the agent – i.e. higher level 
motivational elements should cause or provide a reason for the lower level 
ones, (b) suggests that second order volitions should be merely ‘in accord’ with 
the first-order desires which constitute the will of an agent. 
Moreover, I argue that Frankfurt (1971) is also ambiguous between two 
different readings of concept (a), that is, the condition that a person possesses 
free will if she can make her will and second-order volitions conform. More 
precisely, meaning (a) is fulfilled by the respect of two different control 
conditions: 
 
(i) Actual control. The relation of control between motivational elements of 
the agent has to be satisfied only in an actual scenario but not in a 
counterfactual one. 
 
(ii) Counterfactual control. The relation of control between higher-order 
desires and lower-level ones has to be satisfied both in an actual and in 
a counterfactual scenario. 
 
The difference between condition (i) and (ii) can be understood as the 
difference between having actual causal power only in the actual moment or 
across a wide range of circumstances. In the former, the agent exercises control 
on her will by exercising causal control in the actual scenario, while in the latter, 
such a condition of control has to be respected in different conditional 
circumstances. 
Building on these remarks, my claim is that Frankfurt (1971) proposes three 
different concepts of free will: 
 
(c1) Free will as counterfactual causation, according to which the condition 
of causal control has to be respected both in an actual and in a 
counterfactual scenario. 
(c2) Free will as actual causation, according to which the condition of 
causal control has to be satisfied only in an actual scenario. 
1.THREE CONCEPTS OF FREE WILL  
	
	
31 
(c3) Free will as mere conformity, according to which the condition of 
control does not have to be satisfied. 
 
In the remainder of this section, I will spell out the differences between 
these three concepts.16 I will also suggest that these three concepts of free will 
provide Frankfurt’s theory with different grounding elements for freedom. 
 
 
1.4.1 Free will as counterfactual causation 
 
As an illustration of (c1), that is, free will as counterfactual causation, one can 
consider the following passage (Frankfurt 1971, 24): 
 
A person’s will is free only if he has the will he wants. This means that 
with regard to any of his first-order desires, he is free either to make that 
desire his will or to make some other first-order desire his will instead. 
Whatever his will, then, the will of the person whose will is free could have 
been otherwise; he could have done otherwise than constitute the will as 
he did.  
 
This concept of free will is meant to run in parallel with the classical 
compatibilist definition of freedom. As discussed in section 1.3, classical 
compatibilism requires for freedom of the will the fulfilment of two conditions. 
On the one hand, it requires that the agent’s behaviour is produced by her 
wants, beliefs, desires. On the other hand, it requires the presence for the agent 
of counterfactual alternative possibilities, and says that if the agent had been 
motivated differently, her behaviour would have been different. 
In the same way, according to Frankfurt a person possesses free will only 
if she is free to have the will she wants. This definition implies the presence of 
two different conditions for free will. On the one hand, it implies the presence 
																																																						
16 The distinction that I am proposing between different conceptions of freedom has been 
neglected in the traditional literature about Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory. Rostbøll (2004) tries 
to detect the presence of different ideas of freedom in Frankfurt’s account, and claims that 
Frankfurt distinguishes between an Avoidability Conception and a Satisfaction Conception of 
freedom. I have developed my arguments independently from Rostbøll, and the distinction I 
propose is different from the one he articulates, and serve different purposes in my argument.   
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of alternatives, that is, it implies the possibility that the person is able to choose, 
in an alternative scenario, between different wills.17 Freedom in this picture is 
then constituted as a dependency relation between first-order desires and 
second-order volitions, and the presence of alternatives is related to the higher-
order organisation of a person, i.e. her second-order volitions. Moreover, this 
definition suggests that a person is free if she is in some way able to produce the 
alignment between her will and her second-order volitions. If this happens and 
this is not just a happy chance, then the person’s will aligns with her second-
order volitions and she exercises freedom of the will.  
In which way, however, is the person able to produce the alignment in her 
will? Here it seems that three possibilities stand. First, it can be the case that the 
lower-order desires of the agent cause the higher-order volitions to align. 
Secondly, it can be the case that the higher-order volitions cause the lower-
order volitions to align. Thirdly, it can be the case that the alignment between 
higher-order and lower-order volitions is produced by something else, as for 
example by the agent herself and not, specifically, by her volitions of any order. 
entertaining 
In my interpretation, Frankfurt (1971) is inclined to favour the second 
scenario. In his account, second-order volitions seem to show a causal power: 
they are able to make some first order desires effective and/or they seem able 
to bring about different first-order desires. To motivate this, consider the 
following remarks by Frankfurt (1971, 25, my emphasis) regarding the willing 
addict's situation:  
I am inclined to understand his situation as involving the 
overdetermination of his first-order desire to take the drug. This desire is 
his effective desire because he is physiologically addicted. But it is his 
effective desire also because he wants it to be. His will is outside his control, 
but, by his second-order desire that his desire for the drug should be effective, 
he has made this will his own.  
 
In this passage, Frankfurt explains the alignment in the agent’s will by 
postulating an overdetermination of the willing addict’s first-order desires to 
																																																						
17 It would be interesting to ask whether the presence of a causal relation between higher-
level desires and lower-level ones by itself requires entertaining a counterfactual scenario. 
However, the answer to this question is not clear. For this reason, I will consider the condition 
of internal control and the one of counterfactual control as two different constraints on a theory of 
free will. 
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take the drug: her desire is effective because she is addicted to the drug but, at 
the same time, it is her effective desire because it is produced by her second-
order desire to take the drug.18 By extending Frankfurt’s argument to normal, 
non-addicted agents, it seems that the agent’s effective will is produced, at least 
partially, by the causal action of second-order volitions. 
According to these considerations, it is possible to formulate the first 
definition of free will proposed by Frankfurt: 
 
(Def. 1) Free will as counterfactual causation. A person exercises free will if 
she is free to have the will she wants, and she could have constituted her 
will otherwise than she did. 
 
Summing up, to endorse (Def. 1), it is indeed necessary to endorse the two 
different conditions of (i) actual control and (ii) counterfactual control.19 
My further claim is that these two conditions provide (Def.1) with two 
grounding elements for freedom. On the one hand, according to (i) free will is 
grounded in the role of higher-order volitions as actual causal elements. On the 
other hand, following (ii), free will is secured by the role of higher-order 
volitions as counterfactual possibilities. 
 
1.4.2 Free will as actual causation 
 
In spite of the latter conclusion, in this section I argue that Frankfurt (1971) 
additionally envisages a slightly different conception of free will, as expressed 
by condition (c2). To illustrate this conception, that is free will as actual causation, 
consider the following passage: 
Suppose that a person has done what he wanted to do, that he did it because 
he wanted to do it, and that the will by which he was moved when he did it 
was his will because it was the will he wanted. Then he did it freely and of 
his own free will. Even supposing that he could have done otherwise, he 
would not have done otherwise; and even supposing that he could have 
																																																						
18	At a later time, Frankfurt attempts to explain the alignment in the agent’s will by making 
use of the third possibility, that is, by arguing that the alignment between lower-order and 
higher-order volitions is produced by something else than the agent’s volitions. In particular, 
he shifts the perspective from the casual efficacy of second-order volitions to an activity 
performed by the agent with the act of decision. I discuss this further possibility in chapter 2, 
section 2.3, where I show that Frankfurt’s proposal does not work to ground free will. 
19 Cf. section 1.4, 20. 
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had a different will, he would not have wanted his will to differ from what 
it was.  
(Frankfurt 1971, 24, my emphasis) 
 
The agent described in this passage exercises freedom of the will. In this 
case, however, even if the counterfactual ability could be present, nonetheless 
this definition of free will does not depend on such a counterfactual ability. 
According to this conception of free will, a person’s will is free if her second-
order volitions are internally related to her will. Moreover, even if the person 
could be able to change her will, nonetheless she never has an interest in 
changing it.  
In this light, what Frankfurt requires for exercising free will in this second 
case is only that (i), i.e. actual control, is respected, while it is not necessary that 
(ii), i.e. counterfactual control, is also respected. That is, the agent is exercising 
freedom of the will because she has an internal control over her will, insofar as 
her second-order desires are causally related to her lower-level desires. At the 
same time, she does not have to possess counterfactual control.  
A second definition of free will can be formulated accordingly: 
 
(Def. 2)  Free will as actual causation. A person exercises free will if she has 
the will she wants because it is the will she wants to have, and she has no 
interest in changing it.  
 
As a consequence, (Def.2) provides a slightly different grounding element 
for free will. According to (Def. 2), indeed, freedom is only grounded in the role 
of higher-order desires as actual causal elements. 
 
1.4.3 Free will as mere conformity 
 
It is possible to detect in Frankfurt (1971) a third concept of free will. 
According to conception (c3), that is free will as mere conformity, a person enjoys 
free will if her will is in accord with her second order volitions, that is if her 
will conforms to her second-order volitions: if she wants what she wants to 
want. Conversely, if there is a ‘discrepancy’ between the person’s will and her 
second order volitions, the person is not exercising freedom of the will.  
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As an exemplification of conception (c3), consider the following passages: 
 
The unwilling addict's will is not free. This is shown by the fact that it is 
not the will he wants. It is also true, though in a different way, that the will 
of the wanton addict is not free. The wanton addict neither has the will he 
wants nor has a will that differs from the will he wants. Since he has no 
volitions of the second order, the freedom of his will cannot be a problem 
for him. He lacks it, so to speak, by default.  
(Frankfurt 1971, 22) 
 
The unwilling addict presents conflicts at a higher level with what she 
wishes to be: her action of taking the drug does not issue from a second-order 
volition which is aligned with her will. The reason why the unwilling addict is 
not able to exercise free will, however, is not the obvious circumstance that her 
will is not free, that she is not free to want what she wants to want (she is an 
addict), but merely that there is a discrepancy between her will and her second-
order volitions, that is, she does not have the will she wants. 
 In this passage, then, Frankfurt seems to favour concept (b) of free will (cf. 
section 1.4), that is, that a person exercises free will if her will and her second-
order volitions conform. In order for the agent to assure that the will she has is 
the will she wants to have, a simple relation of accord between higher and 
lower-order wants is required. 
Accordingly, it is possible to provide a third definition of freedom of the 
will: 
 
(Def. 3)  Free will as mere conformity. A person exercises free will when she 
has the will she wants, even if she has no causal control over her will. 
 
What is, then, the grounding element for freedom according to (Def. 3)? It 
seems that with (Def. 3) Frankfurt is requiring neither any form of 
counterfactual control between higher-level volitions and lower-level desires, 
nor any particular causal relation between the two levels, i.e. he is not requiring 
that the higher-level motivational elements causally produce the lower-level 
ones. For this reason, neither of the two elements grounding (Def. 1) and (Def. 
2) seem to have a place here. It seems, then, that freedom as a mere conformity, 
according to which free will only requires the accord between volition of 
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different orders, lacks as such a proper grounding element. Indeed, nothing in 
(Def.3) explains or motivate why a simple relation of accord between the 
different levels of a person’s will is able to secure freedom of the will. In short, 
as it stands, (Def. 3) is not sufficient to ground free will.20 
 
Let us now sum up the three different conceptions of free will defined 
above. To exercise freedom of the will according to (Def. 3) requires the 
acceptance of only weak criteria. In order to exercise free will the agent has to: 
 
I. have second-order volitions, 
II. not have first-order volitions that are not in accord with those second-
order volitions. 
 
On the other hand, to exercise free will according to (Def. 1) and (Def. 2) 
seems to require the acceptance of further, stronger criteria (cf. Stump 1988). In 
addition to (I) and (II), the agent has to: 
 
III. have the first-order volitions she has because of her second-order 
volitions, that is, her second-order volitions have produced his first-
order volitions (Def. 1 and Def. 2). 
IV. and if her second-order volitions had been different, she would have 
had different first-order volitions (Def. 1). 
 
In the next sections, I will suggest some reasons why such different 
conceptions of free will emerged in Frankfurt’s theory (particularly, section 
1.6). Moreover, I will make use of this distinction to offer an original 
formulation of the problem of the willing addict (section 1.5).21 In the very last 
section, I will also apply this distinction to revisit Watson’s (1975) classical 
objection to Frankfurt’s theory (section 1.7). 
	
 
																																																						
20 Later on, Frankfurt provides this conception of free will with a possible grounding element: 
the one of wholehearted satisfaction (cf. Frankfurt 1992). In chapter 2, section 2.5, I argue that such 
a ground is not effective enough to motivate an accord theory of free will. 
21 In chapter 3, section 3.8, I offer as well an original solution to the problem of the willing’s 
addict freedom. There, I suggest that the willing addict is only allowed to exercise free will in 
a weaker sense than the one claimed by Frankfurt (1971).  
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1.5 The freedom of the willing addict 
 
The tension between the three definitions of free will becomes more 
evident towards the end of the paper (§IV), when Frankfurt introduces the 
analysis of the willing addict. The willing addict has conflicting first-order 
desires with regard to taking a drug. But the second-order volitions of the 
willing addict are in line with her addictive first-order desire to take the drug: 
she wants to take the drug and wants her will to be formed by such a desire. 
According to Frankfurt, then: 
 
The willing addict’s will is not free, for his desire to take the drug will be 
effective regardless of whether or not he wants this desire to constitute his 
will. But when he takes the drug, he takes it freely and of his own free will.  
(Frankfurt 1971, 24, my emphasis) 
 
At a first glance, the understanding of such a case is not completely clear. 
Indeed, even if the willing addict’s will is not free, she does have the will she 
wants to have. In light of this, how is it possible for a person to do something 
of her “own free will” if her “will is not free”? The case of the freedom of the 
willing addict is very controversial.22 However, I suggest analysing her case in 
terms of the three definitions of free will provided above.  
According to (Def. 3), that is free will as mere conformity, the willing addict 
is accorded freedom of the will. For the will of the willing addict conforms to 
her second-order volitions: she wants to take the drug and wants her will to be 
formed by such a desire. 
According to (Def. 1), that is free will as counterfactual causation, the willing 
addict fails to exercise free will, despite the fact that her will is precisely what 
she wants it to be. More precisely, to exercise freedom of the will according to 
(Def. 1), the willing addict should be able to satisfy both actual and counterfactual 
control over her will. As a matter of fact, the willing addict fails to satisfy the 
condition of counterfactual control, which is essential for satisfying (Def. 1). The 
willing addict does not possess counterfactual control over her will; that is, she 
could not have done otherwise than constitute the will as she did, because her 
																																																						
22 See for useful remarks on this issue Neely (1974); Locke (1975); Slote (1980); Taylor (2005). 
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will is subjected to an inescapable physiological addiction. This is sufficient to 
say that the willing addict fails to satisfy (Def. 1). 
According to (Def. 2), however, the willing addict should only satisfy actual 
causation. That is, her higher-level motivational elements should be in a direct, 
internal relation with her lower-level ones. At first glance, it seems that here 
the direct relation between higher-level desires and lower-level desires is not 
respected, because the willing addict’s desire is effective due to her 
physiological addiction. In the light of this, if the willing addict’s first-order 
desire for the drug is due to an addiction, it is not correct to say that her higher-
level desires causally produced her lower-level ones.  
However, in the passage quoted above, Frankfurt seems to claim the 
opposite, that is, that when the willing addict takes the drug, she “takes it freely 
and of her own free will.” Now, Frankfurt is clearly pointing out that the willing 
addict, compared to the unwilling addict, exercises freedom of the will. Indeed, 
to better illustrate the case of the willing addict, Frankfurt is inclined to extend 
the kind of freedom she enjoys to other, non-addicted persons: 
 
Suppose that a person has done what he wanted to do, that he did it because 
he wanted to do it, and that the will by which he was moved when he did it 
was his will because it was the will he wanted. Then he did it freely and of 
his own free will. Even supposing that he could have done otherwise, he 
would not have done otherwise; and even supposing that he could have 
had a different will, he would not have wanted his will to differ from what 
it was.  
(Frankfurt 1971, 24, my emphasis) 
 
The agent in Frankfurt’s example exercises free will because she respects 
(Def. 2), that is a condition of actual control on her will. Accordingly, the only 
way to say that the willing addict exercises free will in the same way is to claim 
that the willing addict’s second-level wants do causally produce the first-level 
ones, i.e. she is free in the actual scenario to want what she wants to want. 
However, to accept this conclusion one has to postulate, as Frankfurt does, an 
overdetermination of the willing addict’s first-order desires to take the drug: her 
desire is effective because she is addicted to the drug but, at the same time, it is 
her effective desire because she wants it to be (Frankfurt 1971, 25).   
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If, however, one wants to reject the overdetermination strategy, one has to 
conclude in contrast with Frankfurt’s position that the willing addict fails to 
exercise free will even according to (Def. 2), that is, free will as actual causation. 
Accordingly, the only way in which the willing addict is allowed to exercise 
free will would be by (Def. 3), that is, free will as a mere conformity between 
higher and lower-level desires.  
 
 
1.6 Freedom as a twofold ability 
 
I suggest that the tension between the three concepts of free will arises 
because of Frankfurt’s different treatment of the problem of free will and of the 
one of moral responsibility (1971, 14-16). According to Frankfurt: 
 
It is a vexed question just how "he could have done otherwise" is to be 
understood in contexts such as this one. But although this question is 
important to the theory of freedom, it has no bearing on the theory of 
moral responsibility. For the assumption that a person is morally 
responsible for what he has done does not entail that the person was in a 
position to have whatever will he wanted. This assumption does entail that 
the person did what he did freely, or that he did it of his own free will. It 
is a mistake, however, to believe that someone acts freely only when he is 
free to do whatever he wants or that he acts of his own free will only if his 
will is free.  
(Frankfurt 1971, 24)  
 
In this passage, Frankfurt attempts to spell out the pertinence of the ability 
to do otherwise in contexts that concerns both freedom of the will and moral 
responsibility. Frankfurt thinks that questions about the ability to do otherwise 
are irrelevant when accounting for moral responsibility (Frankfurt 1969).23 This 
means that a person can be morally responsible for what she has done even if 
																																																						
23 Frankfurt (1969) imagines cases in which an agent acts freely but at the same time she is 
not able to do otherwise. He imagines a situation in which an external intervention - say, an 
evil neuroscientist - manipulates the agent’s brain, and blocks an alternative course of action 
only in those situations where the agent decides to act contrary to the neuroscientist’s desires. 
However, the agent happens to act in accordance with the neuroscientist’s desires 
autonomously, without any need for the neuroscientist to intervene. In such a case, the actual 
course of action is a free one, and the agent is responsible for her choice in performing that 
action, even if he was not really able to do otherwise at the moment of that action. 
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she was not able to do otherwise, that is, even if she cannot have had whatever 
will she wanted. However, according to Frankfurt, to be morally responsible 
entails that a person did what she did of her own free will.  As an explanation of 
the distinction between ‘having the will one wants’ and ‘acting on one’s own 
free will,’ Frankfurt claims that it is a mistake to believe that someone acts of 
her own free will only if her will is free. For Frankfurt, a person is also free if 
she acts on her own free will. That is, a person is free if she acts with a will that 
is free and if she acts of her own free will. 
To clarify these quite obscure distinctions, I propose to rephrase 
Frankfurt’s claims about the difference between free will and moral 
responsibility in terms of the three definitions of free will provided above. 
According to Frankfurt, to be morally responsible it is sufficient that a 
person enjoys free will in the sense described by (Def.2), that is, free will as actual 
causation: if the person’s will aligns with her second-order volitions, and her 
second-order volitions are internally causally related to her lower-level ones, 
she is acting of her own free will and she is morally responsible for what she 
has done, even if she could not have done otherwise and have another will 
instead. In Frankfurt’s words: 
 
Moreover, since the will that moved him when he acted was his will 
because he wanted it to be, he cannot claim that his will was forced upon him 
or that he was a passive bystander to its constitution. Under these 
conditions, it is quite irrelevant to the evaluation of his moral 
responsibility to inquire whether the alternatives that he opted against 
were actually available to him.  
(Frankfurt 1971, 24, my emphasis) 
 
The exercise of free will, however, is a more complex matter. Frankfurt says 
that the conditional ability to do otherwise is important for accounting for free 
will. That is, he seems to favor (Def. 1) of free will: free will as counterfactual 
causation, according to which a person exercises free will if she is free to have 
the will she wants and she could have constituted her will otherwise than she 
did. However, he claims as well that only (Def. 2), that is, actual causation, is 
necessary to exercise free will: in the passage quoted above, the agent is morally 
responsible for her actions exactly because she is acting of her own free will. 
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The best way to understand this distinction is to say that Frankfurt seems 
to point to two different abilities involved in the exercise of free will: 
 
i. Acting of one’ s own free will  
ii. Acting with a will that is free 
 
At the same time, he seems to say that while (i), ‘acting with one’s own free 
will’, only requires internal control (Def. 2), (ii), ‘acting with a will that is free’, 
requires counterfactual control as well (Def. 1). 
However, what remains outside of this analysis of free will is the case of 
the willing addict. As I argued in the previous section, if one rejects the 
overdetermination strategy, then the willing addict is exercising freedom of the 
will neither in the sense of ‘acting with a will that is free’, nor in the weaker 
sense of ‘acting of one’s own free will’. If my analysis is correct, the willing 
addict is allowed to enjoy free will only according to (Def. 3), that is, free will 
as a mere accord between higher and lower-order volitions. Accordingly, the 
only way Frankfurt has to save the analysis of the willing addict as an agent 
who “act freely” and “of his own free will” would be the one of dropping even 
the assumption of actual causation, and to claim that to exercise (i), that is, to ‘act 
with one’s own free will’, the agent has only to satisfy (Def.3), that is, one has 
only to have higher-order volitions in accord with the lower-level ones.  
In the rest of the dissertation, I will refer only to meaning (i) of free will, 
that is, I understand free will as the ability to ‘act with one’s own free will.’ My 
aim is to show that a coherent account of free will so understood necessarily 
drops the condition of internal causal control. Particularly, in chapter 2, I will 
argue that after his seminal paper Frankfurt tries to reinforce an account of free 
will as (Def.2) with different concepts (i.e., decision). However, I show that 
maintaining this condition, as Frankfurt tries to do, would only lead to 
contradictory intuitions about the ability to exercise free will. 
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1.7 Watson’s criticism revisited 
 
In the previous sections, I argued that Frankfurt’s (1971) hierarchical 
theory is ambiguous between three different conceptions of free will. I also 
suggested that such an ambiguity lies in the different roles played by higher-
order volitions in Frankfurt’s theory of free will. At the same time, I argued that 
the three definitions of free will discussed above provide Frankfurt’s theory 
with different possible grounding elements for freedom. However, it seems 
that there is, prima facie, a preliminary structural problem with Frankfurt’s 
theory. A well-known objection, firstly presented by Watson (1975), casts 
doubts on the very role of higher-order volitions as a securing element for 
freedom of the will. In this section I aim to show that the three different 
definitions of free will provided above account for different strategies of reply 
to Watson’s concern. Nonetheless, I conclude that none of the strategies is able 
to justify the role of higher-order volitions as a grounding element for freedom 
of the will. 
Watson’s concern is that the hierarchical structure of the will favoured by 
Frankfurt, and particularly the role of higher-order volitions, is not adequate to 
secure free will and self-determination. According to Watson, Frankfurt’s use 
of a hierarchical structure to guarantee free will is meant to account for the 
agent’s self-determination with respect to her own desires. The hierarchical 
structure supports the intuitive claim that some desires are more truly ‘the 
agent’s own’ than other desires. Even if all desires are in a sense the agent’s 
own, nonetheless the agent usually identifies herself with some particular 
wants - in Frankfurt’s terms, ‘higher-order volitions’ - and such wants are 
considered by the agent herself as the expression of her ‘real self.’ In this light, 
in the case of conflicts in the agent’s motivational system, Frankfurt (1971) 
claims that the first-order (or second-order) desire which is in the end endorsed 
by the agent is the one which presents a higher-order volition concerning it, 
while the other desire in conflict only has a volition of a lower-level order 
concerning it. 
However, Watson contends, this condition is enough to guarantee free will 
only if the higher-order volition of the agent is itself one by which the agent 
really wants to be determined. In other words, if it is itself freely willed. As 
Watson suggests, though, Frankfurt’s theory does not seem to have the 
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resources to justify this condition: according to the theory as it stands, there is 
apparently no reason to give a special status in the hierarchy to higher-order 
volitions rather than to the lower-level ones. Since higher-order volitions are 
just desires, there is no immediate explanation for the claim that it is their role 
in the agent’s motivational structure that assures that the agent’s desires are 
freely willed. 
More precisely, Watson points out to two problems. On the one hand, to 
say that freedom of a higher-order volition is guaranteed by forming another 
volition of an even higher-order would lead to a regress, and to terminate it at 
any particular level would be quite arbitrary. Let us call this issue the Regress 
Problem.  
On the other hand, besides the Regress Problem, there is apparently no 
reason in Frankfurt’s theory according to which an agent should “care about 
one’s higher-order volitions” more than about lower-order volitions. Let us call 
this issue the Specialness Problem. In Watson’s words: 
 
Can’t one be a wanton, so to speak, with respect to one’s second-order 
desires and volitions?  
(Watson 1975, 217) 
 
And moreover: 
 
Higher-order volitions are just, after all, desires, and nothing about their 
level gives them any special authority with respect to externality. If they 
have authority, they are given it by something else. To have significance, 
the hierarchy must be grounded in something else that precludes 
externality.  
(Watson 1987, 149) 
 
It is Frankfurt’s idea that the agent exercises free will if and only if the 
desires which form the agent’s will are internal and not alien to the self. If, 
however, the agent’s volitions are external to the self, then the agent is not 
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exercising free will (cf. Frankfurt 1977).24 Nevertheless, if this is true, what can 
prevent higher-order desires from being themselves external to the self? 
According to Watson, there is apparently no reason in Frankfurt’s theory why 
higher-order volitions can prevent the risk of externality in a different way 
from lower-order volitions. Crucially, Watson claims, it is impossible to 
prevent the risk of externality for second-order volitions as well. Indeed, since 
second-order volitions are simply desires, it is impossible to prevent them from 
being external to the self by just pointing out to their position in the hierarchy.  
Watson himself, for example, thinks that externality is prevented only if 
the hierarchy of desires is grounded in our evaluations. According to Watson, 
an addict who is lead to the action of taking a drug by a desire that is rejected 
by her “valuational system” is not, for this reason, identifying with such a 
desire (28-29). However, Watson gives up on this account in 1987. The reason 
for this, Watson says, is that it is always possible for an agent to identify with 
a course of action which she does not consider the best, or the one that matters 
most.25 
 
How Frankfurt’s (1971) theory is affected by this objection? In the previous 
sections, I argued that in Frankfurt (1971) higher-order volitions perform 
different roles when accounting for free will. More precisely, I argued that the 
condition of control which is supposed to link the agent’s higher-order 
motivational elements with the lower-order ones is spelled out by Frankfurt in 
different ways, thus giving rise to three definitions of free will. In light of this, 
I propose to rephrase Watson’s objection (WO) by focusing on the different role 
which higher-order volitions perform in the different definitions.  
On the one hand, if one considers (Def. 1) and (Def.2), (WO) to the notion 
of higher-order volitions can be expressed as follows:  
 
																																																						
24 In the next chapter, section 2.2, I will take into account in details the issue of 
internality/externality. 
25 Another reading of the role of second-order volitions in the agent’s motivational structure 
is advanced by Eleonore Stump. She claims that second-order desires secure freedom not just 
because they are of a higher-order, but “because the agent’s second-order desires are the 
expressions of his intellect’s reflection on his will” (Stump 1988, 408). 
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(WO/causal): how does the fact that higher-order volitions causally produce 
lower-level desires reply to the Regress Problem and to the Specialness 
Problem?  
 
On the other hand, if one considers (Def.3), (WO) can be expressed as 
follows:  
 
(WO/accord): how does the fact that higher-order volitions are in accord 
with lower-order reply to the Regress Problem and to the Specialness 
Problem?  
 
I begin by considering (WO/causal). One way to explain why, in this 
picture, second-order volitions are themselves free, and thus are able to ground 
freedom for lower-level desires, is to say that the second-order volition is free 
because it can always be regarded as free from the standpoint of an even 
higher-order volition. As Watson notes, however, such a reply runs the risk of 
incur in the Regress Problem.  
By making use of (Def.1) or (Def.2), such a claim can be rephrased by stating 
that the freedom of every higher-order volition is guaranteed by the fact that it 
is causally produced by a further free higher-order volition, and so on ad 
infinitum. In other words, (Def. 1) and (Def.2) work by extending causal control 
all the way up to the hierarchy, as it is expressed by the following condition: 
 
(C) To will freely, the agent has to have causal control on her volitions all 
the way up to the hierarchy. 
 
Condition (C) is, however, problematic in at least two respects. On the one 
hand, it is not clear whether infinite hierarchical structures are able to prevent 
the risk of regress pointed out by Watson. On the other hand, it seems that, 
even in their causal form, infinite motivational structures are not able to avoid 
the risk of externality for the agent’s higher-order volitions. 
According to Lehrer (1980), for example, infinite causal hierarchical 
structures are adequate to reply to the Regress Problem. On his account, the 
regress exists but is not vicious, because when a person acts freely, she possibly 
possesses controlling preferences of this sort all the way up (cf. Lehrer 1980, 
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193). According to Lehrer, infinite hierarchical structures are plausible if one 
claims that indifference, too, is an attitude: “if S freely prefers K at level n, then 
S must either prefer to have that preference or must be indifferent” (193). In 
this light, to be indifferent is a “primitive” preference and there are no issues 
in the claim that people have preferences all the way up. Indeed, starting from 
a certain level, people are indifferent all the rest of the way up. Lehrer suggests 
as well that even from a psychological point of view, infinite hierarchical 
structures are not a problem, because it is possible for persons to process things 
computationally, a step at a time, without grasping the whole sequence in a 
single moment of intuition.   
Such a strategy, however, seems not satisfactory. On the one hand, as Shatz 
(1985) suggests, the condition of control offered by indifference is “entirely 
negative; that is, ‘control’ is being exercised by the absence of a specific 
preference” (457). On the other hand, such a reply seems to be incompatibilist 
in its essence. Indeed, if every level of the hierarchy is subjected to the agent’s 
internal and causal control, then this excludes the possibility that at any level 
the agent’s wants are caused by an external cause. Zimmerman (1981, 359), for 
example, is well-aware of such an issue when he writes:  
 
It is no part of this program to claim that we are always free ‘to please as 
we please as we please’… Precisely because he concedes the truth of 
determinism the compatibilist is perfectly willing to acknowledge that 
even where a desire is free, there is some point in the motivational 
hierarchy where the higher-order desire playing the crucial endorsing role 
is itself an unwilled, unendorsed part of the agent’s motivational 
equipment, to be explained in terms of non-motivational causes. 
 
Moreover, it seems that there is a further issue with condition (C), as it 
seems not sufficient to prevent the risk of externality. As Van Inwagen (1983) 
and Segerberg (1983) have pointed out, it might be that some external 
manipulator controls what an agent desires at all levels and, at the same time, 
what the agent would desire at all levels if her preferences were different. In 
such a scenario, all the agent’s preferences are not in her control, but in the 
manipulator’s control. In other words, in a manipulation-scenario, the mere 
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truth of (C) does not exclude the possibility of manipulation on the agent’s 
motivational structure.26 The risk of externality is then not avoided. 
Does the use of (Def. 1) or (Def. 2) help reply to the Specialness Problem? To 
repeat, the problem, as Watson points out, is that there is apparently no reason 
in Frankfurt’s theory why an agent should care about one’s higher-order 
volitions more than about lower-order volitions. In this light, Watson contends, 
Frankfurt theory as it is does not elucidate “why or how a particular want may 
have, among all of a person’s desires, the special property of being peculiarly 
his own” (Watson 1975, 218-219) 
With (Def.1) or (Def. 2), one can claim that higher-order volitions are special 
because they causally produce lower-level volitions. However, this reply seems 
to just beg the question. Indeed, the agent may not care at all about the fact that 
higher-order volitions produce her will. At the same time, to claim that the 
freedom of every higher-order volition is guaranteed by the fact that it is 
causally produced by a further free higher-order volition does not say anything 
about why or how it is the higher-order volitions’ role which grounds freedom. 
Without a plausible, further explanation for Frankfurt’s claim, then, it seems 
that higher-order volitions are not sufficient to ground freedom for the 
hierarchy. 
 
Let us now consider (WO/accord). If one takes into account (Def. 3), one has 
to explain why the mere accord between higher-order volitions and lower-order 
desires guarantees freedom for higher-level desires. Moreover, by doing so, 
one has to provide a reply to Watson’s Regress Problem and Specialness Problem. 
I begin by considering the Regress Problem. In the picture suggested by (Def. 
3), to regard a desire as external is to have a contrary higher-order volition 
concerning it. In this light, second-order volitions are themselves free from 
externality if they do not have any contrary volition regarding them. However, 
even in this scenario, a higher-order volition can be so considered only from 
the standpoint of an even higher-order volition, and it is always the highest-
order volition that is decisive. Does such a scenario lead to a regress? 
It seems to me that a relation of mere accord between the levels of the 
hierarchy is not sufficient to stop the regress or to show that the regress, even 
																																																						
26 For different perspectives on the manipulation-objection see Fischer (1994), Kane, (2002b), 
Pereboom (2001) and van Inwagen (1983). 
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if present, is not vicious. In this case, indeed, the presence of a regress prevents 
the determination of freedom for higher-level volitions, by preventing the 
agent’s control with respect to her own desires. While with (Def. 1) or (Def.2) 
the entire motivational structure of the agent is put under her internal causal 
control, with (Def. 3) there is no assurance that the higher-order volitions of an 
agent are themselves internal to the agent’s motivational structure: since they 
are simply desires, they do not apparently possess a particular status against 
externality. 
Let us now consider the Specialness Problem. Frankfurt can point out that 
what in this picture assures that the volitions endorsed by the agent are 
themselves free is that they represent the ‘true self’ of the agent: only when the 
agent endorses volitions which are part of her real self, then she is acting of her 
own free will. However, this strategy seems to just beg the question, because 
there is no obvious reason for the claim that the higher-order volitions 
characterise the real self of the agent. In other words, it seems that without a 
proper ‘theory of personality,’ which could justify the claim that the higher-
level self is the real self, such a claim is unwarranted (cf. for this objection Shatz 
1985, Berofsky 1983). 
In conclusion, nothing in (Def. 3) explains or motivate why a simple 
relation of accord between the different levels of a person’s will is able to secure 
freedom of the will. If one accepts (Def. 3) of free will, then, it is not apparently 
possible to reply to Watson’s objection by simply putting the burden of 
securing freedom on hierarchical structures and higher-order volitions. 
 
 
1.8 Summary of the chapter 
 
In this chapter, I took into account Frankfurt’s classical theory of free will. 
I argued that Frankfurt’s theory can be interpreted as providing an original 
grounding element for freedom, i.e. that free will is mostly grounded in the 
causal role of higher-order desires in the hierarchy. I suggested that Frankfurt 
defines a different ground for freedom by tightening the conditions of control of 
the agent on her desires so as to ensure that the agent controls her motivational 
structure through her higher-order volitions. However, I showed that this 
condition of control is not univocally spelled, because higher-order volitions 
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perform different roles in Frankfurt’s account. As a consequence, I showed that 
Frankfurt’s original theory is ambiguous between three different definitions of 
free will, which I called (Def.1), (Def.2) and (Def. 3). As a direct consequence of 
my claims, I argued that Frankfurt’s theory provides different and unclear 
elements for grounding freedom.  
The primary result of this chapter is then the suggestion that Frankfurt’s 
original theory provides neither a single definition of free will, nor a univocal 
grounding element for freedom. Indeed, because of such an ambiguity, I 
argued that it is not clear if the role of higher-level desires is successful in the 
task of grounding freedom. The line of argument that I presented is, in this 
sense, quite different from classical Watson-style objections to Frankfurt’s 
theory of free will. 
 Distinguishing between these three concepts of freedom served a number 
of additional purposes in this chapter. Specifically, such a distinction allowed 
me to offer an original formulation of the problem of the willing addict (section 
1.5). Contrary to Frankfurt’s claims, I showed that the willing addict does not 
exercise free will according to an actual causal conception of freedom, i.e. 
(Def.2), but only following a mere conformity conception of it, i.e. (Def. 3).  
Moreover, I made use of this distinction to revisit Watson’s (1975) classical 
objection to Frankfurt’s theory (section 1.7). My conclusion is that Frankfurt’s 
theory, even if enhanced with the distinction between three different 
conceptions of free will, is not able to justify the role of higher-order volitions 
as a grounding element for freedom of the will. 
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2  
Freedom and Identification 
 
 
 
2.1 Outline of the chapter 
 
In this chapter, I discuss Frankfurt’s claim that identification is sufficient 
to secure freedom. I argue that Frankfurt makes use of two different notions of 
identification to support his claim. In section 2.3 and 2.4, I show that Frankfurt 
argues for identification by grounding it in the notion of decision. I call such a 
notion active identification (AI) and I contend that it does not work to ground 
freedom. In sections 2.5 and 2.6, I show that Frankfurt rejects this account and 
argues instead for a notion of wholehearted identification secured by the 
concept of satisfaction. I call such a notion wholehearted identification (WI) and I 
suggest that this approach is also doomed to failure. My conclusion, then, is 
that Frankfurt’s notion of identification is not sufficient to ground his 
hierarchical theory of freedom. 
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2.2 Identification and Externality 
 
In chapter 1, I revisited Watson’s objection about the role of higher-order 
volitions as a securing element for freedom of the will. There, I showed that the 
three different definitions of free will present in Frankfurt (1971) provide 
different strategies of reply to Watson’s concerns about the Regress Problem and 
the Speciality Problem. Nonetheless, I concluded that none of the strategies is 
able to justify the role of higher-order volitions as a grounding element for 
freedom of the will. In this chapter, I focus on another aspect of Watson’s 
objection, that I call the Externality argument. Particularly, I investigate 
Frankfurt’s notion of identification, developed in various directions after his 
1971 paper, and I show that such a notion is exactly an attempt to reply to this 
argument. 
Indeed, one way to understand Watson’s objection is by focusing on the 
notion of externality (Watson 1987). What the Externality argument claims is that 
an agent is free if and only if she is able to act on her wants and desires. If the 
desires on which she acts are, on the contrary, alien or external to her 
motivational structure, then she is not acting with a free will.  
Such an argument is mostly supported by compatibilist accounts of free 
will, especially classical compatibilism (cf. Shatz 1985). In this regard, classical 
compatibilism considers free agency in terms of ‘external’ impediments to the 
will of the agent, where external is meant to indicate impediments that are 
found outside the body of the agent. However, the main problem with such an 
account lies exactly in its ‘thin’ notion of will, and in the consequent lack of 
focus on more ‘internal’ impediments, such as addiction, compulsion, phobia 
and the like. What strikes us as problematic in the classic compatibilist account 
is in fact the absence of a satisfactory criterion for internality. Compatibilist 
theories, indeed, seem unable to mark a distinction between externality and 
internality with regard to one’s desires and volitions. The consequence of this 
failure is an account of freedom that is too thin to provide a realistic criterion 
for freedom of the will.  
Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory seems to deal with these problems in a 
better way. The general strategy he adopts is one of construing the agent’s 
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motivational organisation as composed of different levels of desires. In this 
sense, Frankfurt shows that deviant desires or intentions (e.g. the desires of an 
addicted agent) are the result of an incorrect mesh between different levels of 
the person’s motivational structure. Frankfurt also links freedom to the notion 
of what is internal to the agent’s motivational structure. However, the criterion 
that is supposed to mark internality is not merely physical, but is instead 
related to the absence of feelings of estrangement from the agent’s point of 
view.   
As noted by Velleman (2002), Frankfurt’s account of freedom might be 
described as an attempt to find criteria for establishing which psychological 
elements are internal, and which are external to the self. The reason for this, 
Frankfurt says, is that an agent may sometimes consider a desire as ‘external’ 
to her motivation, and so alien to herself, even if such a desire is in a basic sense 
‘her desire’. In turn, such feeling of estrangement is usually connected to the 
agent’s rejection of her desire as a free and autonomous happening. The desires 
associated with such a feeling of estrangement are usually considered as 
unfree, and the agent is just a “passive bystander” to their presence in her 
motivation (cf. Frankfurt 1977). 
To see why the concept of externality is important, consider the possibility 
of conflicts between the different levels of the agent’s will. The hierarchical 
structure of the will proposed by Frankfurt can account for at least two kinds 
of conflict within it. On the one hand, “there may be a conflict between how 
someone wants to be motivated and the desire by which he is in fact most 
powerfully moved” (Frankfurt 1987, 164). In this case, the conflict emerges 
between what the agent really wants (e.g. to refrain from smoking), and the 
desire that turns out in the end to be the strongest one, that is, the desire which 
effectively forms the will of the agent (e.g. to smoke). Since the agent is not able 
to put in alignment her first-order desires with her higher-order volitions, the 
resultant action is not free, because it stems from a desire that is not controlled 
by the agent herself. 
On the other hand, there can be “a lack of coherence within the realm of 
the person's higher-order volitions themselves” (165). Because they are desires, 
higher-order volitions can conflict with each other. For example, an agent may 
be divided between a “jealously spiteful desire to injure” a friend and a desire 
to suppress this motive and benefit her friend (Frankfurt 1977, 63). In this case, 
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the agent is divided about what she really wants, that is, she is uncertain about 
which one of her second-order volitions should produce her effective will. In 
such a case, it is possible to imagine that a person may have volitions of a still 
higher order to solve the conflict between second-order volitions. (“There is no 
theoretical limit to the length of the series of desires of higher and higher 
orders”, Frankfurt 1971, 21). 
In both cases, the conflicting desires are perceived by the agent as external 
to her motivational structure. What, in such cases, can prevent the agent from 
obstinately refusing to endorse one of her higher-order volitions, so as to act 
with a will that she wants to have, a will which is not ‘external’ to her volitional 
self? 
In the attempt of addressing these issues, Frankfurt (1971) makes use of the 
hierarchical structure of the will to account for the agent’s self-determination 
with respect to her own desires: when the agent’s desires are endorsed by a 
higher-order volition, they can be considered as internal to her motivation, thus 
securing freedom of the will. Moreover, as argued in chapter 1, Frankfurt’s 
(1971) theory of free will finds a viable ground for freedom not just by 
endorsing higher-order volitions, but by establishing a condition of control 
from higher-order volitions to lower-level ones. Such a condition can be said to 
distinguish between desires that are internal to the agent, because they are 
brought about by higher-order volitions, and desires that are external, because 
they are not brought about by higher-order volitions.  
However, toward the end of the paper, Frankfurt introduces a new concept 
to further justify his claims: identification. In Frankfurt’s words: 
 
When a person identifies himself decisively with one of his first-order desires, 
this commitment "resounds" throughout the potentially endless array of 
higher orders. Consider a person who, without reservation or conflict, 
wants to be motivated by the desire to concentrate on his work. The fact 
that his second-order volition to be moved by this desire is a decisive one 
means that there is no room for questions concerning the pertinence of 
volition of higher orders. 
 (Frankfurt 1971, 21, my emphasis) 
 
Roughly, identification is a psychic process by which the agent’s 
motivational elements, in particular her desires, become in some sense ‘her 
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own’. According to such a view, when an agent identifies with a desire, it 
becomes internal to her will, and when she rejects that desire, it becomes 
external. For Frankfurt, when the agent acts on a desire with which she is 
identified, she is acting as an active and autonomous agent. On the contrary, 
when she acts on desires with which she does not identify decisively, she is 
acting in a passive way, because she is moved by desires that she considers as 
alien to herself. To exercise free will is then not just reducible to the agent’s 
correct mesh between volitions and will, but instead it is now a matter of 
decisive identification with certain desires, while a lack of such identification 
would entail the absence of free will. When the agent acts on desires with which 
she has identified, her will becomes constituted by the volitions aligned with 
her identification, that is, with the will she wants to have at a higher-order of 
reflection.27 
The difference between the two solutions proposed by Frankfurt to the 
problem of conflicts in the agent’s motivation is well exemplified by Bratman 
(2002). Bratman notes that in Frankfurt’s (1971) there is a tension between two 
different views. One view is that identification can be reduced to the state of 
affairs in which one's relevant highest-order volition favours one's being 
moved by that desire. The second view suggests that identification with a first-
order desire involves a highest-order volition in its favour but is not simply 
reducible to such a highest-order volition.  
The former view, however, proved to be wrong. As discussed in chapter 1, 
there is a reasonable doubt that the role of higher-order volitions as such is 
adequate to ground free will.28 Particularly, Watson’s (1975) objection forces 
Frankfurt to reject the view that externality is simply avoided by the endorsing 
or even controlling higher-order volitions of the agent.29  
Let us now consider the latter view. In such a picture, it is no longer the 
concept of a higher-order volition that is doing the job of defining internality 
and grounding freedom. Rather, such a work is now done by a further element, 
																																																						
27 A different definition of the notion of identification is given, for example, by Alfred Mele: 
“to identify with a desire one has is, roughly, a matter of desiring to continue to have that desire 
and believing that one’s having it is a good thing” (Mele 2003, 227 and Mele 1995, 117). 
28 Susan Wolf points out a similar concern, when she writes that a person who is alienated 
from a first-order choice “can be alienated from her higher-order choices as well” (Wolf 1990, 
30). 
29 As Bratman notes, a second-order desire is just “one more desire in the psychic stew” 
(Bratman 2007, 23). 
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that is, the agent’s acts of identification or decisive commitment. When an agent 
“identifies … decisively with one of his first-order desires”, Frankfurt claims, she 
is securing freedom for the higher-order volition concerning that desire. 
Unfortunately, however, Frankfurt (1971) does not provide any particular 
argument to justify this claim.  
Such a lack of arguments brings about immediate problems. Indeed, it 
seems that the notion of identification as a higher-order phenomenon which 
marks a criterion for internality and, consequently, secures freedom needs a 
proper basis to accomplish the task. Watson (1975), (1987) and Bratman (2002), 
among others, have raised such a concern about Frankfurt’s use of the notion 
of identification. Roughly, the worry is that identification as Frankfurt 
characterizes it in 1971 is not at all sufficient to protect the agent’s will from the 
risk of externality. In parallel with the criticism to the notion of higher-order 
desire, it seems that there is nothing in the very concept of decisive 
identification which is able to explain why, when an agent identifies with some 
of her desires, she is securing freedom for higher-order volitions. In other 
words, the concern is that the notion of identification as elucidated by Frankfurt 
does not sufficiently underpin a hierarchical account of freedom. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I show that Frankfurt attempts to motivate 
identification in his later papers (particularly, 1987 and 1992) by taking into 
account the second view suggested by Bratman (2002)30 - namely that 
identification with a first-order desire involves a highest-order volition in its 
favour but is not simply reducible to such a highest-order volition - and by 
adopting various new concepts as proper grounds to justify his position. 
Particularly, I argue that Frankfurt makes use of two different notions of 
identification in order to defend his account of freedom. In section 2.3 and 2.4, 
I show that Frankfurt argues for identification by grounding it in the notion of 
decision. I call such a notion active identification (AI) and I contend that it does 
not work to ground freedom. In sections 2.5 and 2.6, I show that Frankfurt 
rejects this account and argues instead for a notion of wholehearted 
identification secured by the concept of satisfaction. I call such a notion 
wholehearted identification (WI) and I suggest that this approach is also doomed 
																																																						
30 Cf. above, 42. 
Identification as Decision 
 
 56 
to failure. My conclusion, then, is that Frankfurt’s notion of identification is not 
sufficient to ground his hierarchical theory of freedom. 
 
 
2.3 Identification as Decision  
 
In this section, I examine the first amendment to the notion of identification 
presented in Frankfurt (1987). In this paper, Frankfurt proposes to validate 
second-order volitions by strengthening the role of decisive identification, 
which in turn is justified by the notion of deliberate decision with respect to one’s 
own desires. My aim is to show that such an attempt fails, and that the concerns 
about the role of identification as used by Frankfurt in his original theory of 
freedom are not addressed in an effective way in this later paper. 
Frankfurt (1987) aims to justify the claim that “making a decisive 
commitment” to avoid an interminable regress of higher-order volitions is not, 
as Watson’s objection argues, unacceptably arbitrary. The overall strategy 
presented by Frankfurt stems from a comparison between the agent’s 
evaluation of her motivational structure and the practice of arithmetic. In this 
context, Frankfurt makes use of the notion of deliberate decision with respect to 
one’s own desires to show that identification helps to avoid externality because 
it is secured by the agent’s deliberate decision about her motivational structure.  
Frankfurt suggests that the situation of ambivalence with respect to one’s 
own desires is significantly similar to the process of arithmetical calculation. 
When calculation begins different answers to a problem are possible. However, 
at the point of terminating a calculation the possible answers are reduced to 
one, and one consequently has no reasons to carry on the calculation. As with 
the case of arithmetic, a person’s decisive identification with a second-order 
volition essentially consists in the person’s persuasion that a further 
examination of her motivational situation will nonetheless lead to the same 
result. In other words, even in the case of a further scrutiny, any higher-order 
volition of the agent will point out to the agent’s preference for a specific first-
order desire, the one recommended by the second-order volition. Therefore, for 
the agent to engage in a potentially endless sequence of evaluations is pointless, 
exactly because the person has decisively identified herself with that particular 
second-order volition.  
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While certainly evocative, Frankfurt calculation metaphor seems to 
provide a quite obscure explanation about the role of decisive identification in 
Frankfurt’s picture of freedom. My argument is that such an obscurity is a 
consequence of the presence of an ambiguity in the notion of decisive 
identification in Frankfurt (1987). To illustrate my claim, let me quote Frankfurt 
at length here: 
 
Both in the case of desires and in the case of arithmetic a person can 
without arbitrariness terminate a potentially endless sequence of 
evaluations when he finds that there is no disturbing conflict, either between 
results already obtained or between a result already obtained and one he 
might reasonably expect to obtain if the sequence were to continue. 
Terminating the sequence at that point - the point at which there is no 
conflict or doubt - is not arbitrary. For the only reason to continue the 
sequence would be to cope with an actual conflict or with the possibility 
that a conflict might occur. Given that the person does not have this reason 
to continue, it is hardly arbitrary for him to stop.  
(Frankfurt 1987, 169, my emphasis) 
 
And moreover: 
 
On the other hand, a sequence of calculations might end because the 
person conducting it decides for some reason to adopt a certain result. It may 
be that he is unequivocally confident that this result is correct, and 
therefore believes that there is no use for further inquiry. Or perhaps he 
believes that even though there is some likelihood that the result is not 
correct, the cost to him of further inquiry - in time or in effort or in lost 
opportunities - is greater than the value to him of reducing the likelihood 
of error. In either event there may be a "decisive" identification on his part. 
In a sense that I shall endeavor to explain, such an identification resounds 
through an unlimited sequence of possible further reconsiderations of his 
decision.  
(Frankfurt 1987, 170, my emphasis) 
 
I suggest that according to Frankfurt’s metaphor the process of decisive 
identification comprises two different elements. Particularly, it seems that a 
person properly identifies with a lower-order desire in at least two ways: 
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(1) when she has an unopposed higher-order volition to act in accord with 
the lower-order desire, and she judges that any further deliberation 
would be pointless, and/or 
 
(2) when she decides that a certain second-order volition is what she 
really wants to be her will. 
 
To illustrate claim (1), let us consider again Frankfurt’s arithmetical 
metaphor. As suggested by Frankfurt, when calculation begins different 
answers to a problem are possible. However, at a certain point the agent 
terminates a calculation because she “finds” that there are no more conflicts in 
the possible answers, and she consequently has no reasons to carry on with the 
calculation. When this happens, there is a decisive identification of the subject 
with the object of her calculation. Such identification “resounds through an 
unlimited sequence of possible further reconsiderations” of her decision (169). 
It resounds endlessly, and this is exactly the reason why the person stops the 
calculation. 
Similarly, a person is moved to reflect on her own desires, either because 
there effectively is a conflict among them or because she has a lack of 
confidence in the fact that she is satisfied with her motives. However, as in the 
case of arithmetic, to terminate such a sequence of evaluation is not arbitrary. 
Indeed, according to Frankfurt, in such a situation too, a person who is engaged 
in a reflection about her own desires “finds” at a certain point that there are no 
more conflicts between her first-order desires and second-order volitions, or 
between her second-order volitions themselves. When she judges that there is 
no reason to carry on the scrutiny of her motives, she decisively identifies with 
the lower order desire which corresponds to an unopposed higher-order 
volition. 
It seems appropriate to understand the process described by Frankfurt’s 
claim (1) as a sort of discovery and recognition made by the person. When the 
agent recognises an unopposed higher-order volition in accord with a lower-
order desire, she judges that any further deliberation would be unnecessary, 
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and she identifies herself with the lower-order desire in alignment with that 
unopposed high-order volition.31  
In this picture, the person has no need to create a different alignment 
through the act of identification: some higher-order volitions are already in 
alignment with the agent's will, and when she discovers that this is the case, 
the agent secures her freedom and activity through her identification with 
them. However, it is exactly her act of decisive identification and commitment with 
her unopposed higher-order volitions that prevents externality for her 
motivational structure. The agent’s decisive identification with some of her 
desires is what guarantees that the unopposed desires which occur in her, and 
so that are in a sense ‘external’ to her, become incorporated into her will, thus 
becoming ‘internal’ to her own will.  
At this stage of the paper, Frankfurt is then proposing the following 
criterion for internality: higher-order volitions are internal to the motivational 
structure of the agent when they are unopposed or decisive with respect to the 
agent’s will. Such a status, however, is fully ratified by the agent’s endorsement 
by means of decisive identification. If this is Frankfurt’s answer, however, then 
prima facie it is not very different from the original formulation of the notion of 
identification presented in Frankfurt (1971). In this picture, the burden of 
securing freedom is not just on the notion of unopposed higher-order volitions, 
but also on the agent’s ability to identify with them. This claim, however, seems 
unjustified, and the risk of externality for unopposed volitions arises again. 
Indeed, the notion of decisive identification with unopposed higher-order 
volitions, in itself, does not suggest a plausible explanation for Frankfurt’s 
claims. 
At this point, Frankfurt can reply that in this picture identification is 
justified with the same arguments expressed in Frankfurt (1975): the freedom 
of the higher-order volitions, ratified by the act of decisive identification, is in 
the end simply self-determining; in this sense, higher-order volitions self-
constitute the activity of the person and it is impossible for the agent to be a 
passive bystander to them. For this reason, questions about the legitimacy of 
identification simply cannot arise (Frankfurt 1975, 54). In this picture, the 
burden of the argument is once again on the notion of higher-order volitions. 
																																																						
31 In section 2.4, I argue that a such a conception of freedom as discovery is what justifies 
Frankfurt’s proposal of wholehearted satisfaction.  
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Unopposed higher-order volitions are free and exempt from externality simply 
because they are higher on the hierarchy than first-order desires, and because 
(in an admittedly mysterious sense) they self-constitute the activity of the 
agent. But if this is Frankfurt’s characterisation of identification, then it runs 
the risk to fall again under Watson’s primitive objection: higher-order volitions, 
since they are desires, are subjected to externality, and to claim that some of 
them are unopposed or decisive with respect to the agent’s will by just pointing 
out their position in the hierarchy seems not to be a satisfactory reply. 
 
I suspect that it is exactly due to the lack of a convincing argument for 
endorsing such a picture that Frankfurt is ultimately led to propose a further 
element to justify identification. Indeed, to avoid this kind of issues, Frankfurt 
introduces at the end of the paper the further notion of decision. A person 
properly identifies with a lower-order desire, Frankfurt says, when: 
  
(2) she decides that a certain higher-order volition is what she really wants 
to be her will.  
 
According to claim (2), what prevents an infinite regress of higher-order 
volitions and secures freedom for higher-order desires is located in the agent’s 
act of decision (Frankfurt 1987, 170). Frankfurt says that the role of deliberate 
decision is one of “creating an intention” (172). Intentions, in this sense, involve 
a commitment to actively suppress some desires in favour of others. 
Accordingly, they suggest the possibility of changing the configuration of one’s 
will: in deciding in favour of a desire, and in identifying with it, the agent is 
creating an intention that will enable her to reconfigure her will and to make 
the desire on which she decides fully her own. How does Frankfurt justify this 
claim?  
Here, Frankfurt is suggesting that identification with a first-order desire 
still involves a higher-order volition in its favour, but is however not simply 
reducible to it. 32 In particular, the further element provided by Frankfurt to 
ground identification is the one of deliberative decision. Decision so understood 
represents a viable criterion for internality. This suggestion, Frankfurt says, is 
																																																						
32 Cf. Bratman (2002)’s argument, above, 42. 
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immune to Watson’s objection because “[d]ecisions, unlike desires and 
attitudes, do not seem susceptible… to externality” (Frankfurt 1975, 68). 
At this point of the paper, then, Frankfurt proposes the following criterion 
for internality: the agent’s desires are internal when they are brought about by 
the act of decision performed by the agent. Are decisions, however, really 
immune to externality? Velleman (1992) has claimed that such an appeal to 
decision does not work, because the agent can make “unwitting decisions” 
with which she does not identify. Velleman’s example concerns a situation in 
which remarks of a friend provoke me to get angry and raise my voice. On later 
reflection, I recognise that the previous “grievances had crystallized in my 
mind. . . into a resolution to sever our friendship” (164). However, such a 
decision made by myself was unwitting, and now I understand that at the time 
of that decision I was not really identifying with it. As Velleman says, in a case 
like this “it was my resentment speaking, not I” (164-165). 33  
If Velleman is right, then it seems that a mere appeal to decisions is not 
enough to secure the agent’s motivation from externality, as Frankfurt 
previously suggested. In Velleman’s scenario, decisions seem at such 
susceptible both to internality and to externality. Moreover, Velleman’s 
objection can be generalised, and one can claim that regarding any mental 
occurrence, even a decision, it is always possible to raise the question of 
whether or not the agent identifies with it. In this sense, identification cannot 
simply involve some actual mental act. On the contrary, for identification to 
work, it seems that one needs to appeal to a further grounding concept, which 
is not simply reducible to a mental act or occurrence. 
 
 
2.4 Active Identification 
 
In this section, I advance a reading of Frankfurt’s claim (2), presented in 
the previous section.34 I suggest that one way to make his proposal work, 
namely that decision is the element which prevents externality for higher-order 
																																																						
33 Bratman (2002) notes that the unwitting decision of Velleman’s example is merely a first-
order one. Frankfurt might argue for this reason that Velleman is talking about choices and not 
decisions in the sense he endorses. However, Velleman's example could be easily rephrased so 
as to involve an unwitting decisions in favour of an higher-order desire, for example, the desire 
to severe the friendship. (6) 
34 See above, 48. 
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volitions, is by introducing a further grounding element for identification: 
active control of the agent with respect to her own desires. I call such a notion of 
identification active identification (AI). However, I show that the outcome of 
such a reading is not acceptable in light of Frankfurt’s overall theory of 
freedom. 
I argue that decision works to justify identification if one appeals 
intuitively to the idea that freedom necessarily involves a voluntaristic act 
performed by the agent. Such a picture does not simply rely on the notion of 
decisive identification, but makes use of a further element to justify 
identification: the concept of activity. Frankfurt followed a similar strategy in 
his 1975 paper “Three concepts of a free action”. In this paper, he tried to justify 
the role of identification by appealing to the notions of activity and self-
determination. He writes:  
 
As for a person's second-order volitions themselves, it is impossible for 
him to be a passive bystander to them. They constitute his activity — i.e., 
his being active rather than passive — and the question of whether or not 
he identifies himself with them cannot arise. 
(Frankfurt 1975, 54)  
 
In this passage, Frankfurt argues that the freedom of the second-order 
volitions is simply self-determining and as such not questionable, because 
higher-order volitions constitute the activity of the subject. In this picture, 
second-order volitions are free and exempt from externality because they are 
said to be – quite mysteriously - the active component in the agent’s 
motivational structure. In this paper, Frankfurt adopts the activity of the 
second-order volitions as a notion which does not require a further 
explanation.  
I suggest that in his 1987 paper, he complements this explanation through 
bringing the notion of decision into the picture. Indeed, the active element 
provided by Frankfurt to ground identification is deliberative decision. I argue 
that decision so understood can play the role of an act immune to externality 
because it introduces an element of active control of the agent with respect to 
her own desires. In this sense, the act of decision assures that the agent’s desires 
are freely willed, because they are produced by the agent’s own controlling 
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resolutions. In this light, freedom for higher-order volitions is secured because, 
with her deliberate decisions, the agent is able to ‘create her own will,’ thus 
assuring that she is free to will what she wants to will.  
Such a notion of identification works not just by pointing to other higher-
order phenomena in the agent’s motivation, but instead is justified by the active 
decisions of the agent. I would like to call this notion of identification active 
identification (AI): 
 
(AI) Freedom for higher-order volitions is secured when the agent 
identifies herself with the second-order volitions she decides to bring to 
alignment with her will. 
In this picture, Frankfurt can justify his claims by appealing directly to the 
notion of activity: decisions are able to secure freedom because, when the agent 
decides in favour of a certain higher-order volition, she is active with respect 
to her will and not just a passive bystander to it. It follows that higher-order 
volitions brought about in such a way simply cannot be external to the agent’s 
will. 
In the rest of the section, I ask if such a strategy is viable, that is, if the 
notion of (AI) succeeds in providing a securing element for freedom and is itself 
immune to externality.  
I suggest that Frankfurt can reply to this question by remarking that if one 
takes into account (AI), then Watson’s objections are simply misguided. Indeed, 
higher-order desires brought about by decisions simply do not need higher-
order endorsement because the agent is active and not passive with regard to 
them. If the agent is not passive with respect to them, they simply cannot be 
external and, hence, unfree. As Cuyper (1998) notes, such a use of the notion of 
decision allows Frankfurt to escape Watson’s objection because a decision is 
not something which is obscurely ‘self-constitutive’: decisions seem to be 
exempt from externality exactly because they are “act of the will” (47). 
Decisions are, in a sense, necessarily active: if the person identifies herself with 
her first-order desires by making a deliberate decision and producing the 
relevant intentions, it seems that such identification is an active rather than a 
passive process.  
However, the appeal to the notion of activity in terms of ‘deliberative 
decisions’ and ‘acts of the will’ risks to provide only an insufficient explanation 
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to why, when endorsed by them, volitions are actually free. For which are the 
consequences of putting the burden of securing freedom on such kinds of act 
of the will? One unpleasant consequence is pointed out by Cuyper (1998, 48), 
when he notes that:  
 
Looked upon from this angle, Frankfurt’s hierarchical model constitutes 
an attempt to reduce the notion of agent-causation within the explanatory 
framework of naturalism, yet in the end this project of reduction proves to 
be circular. He tries to account for autonomy and robust activity — that is 
to say, self-determination — in terms of reflective identification, but the 
explanation of decisive second-order volitions presupposes the primitive 
notion of agent-causation.  
A charitable reading of Frankfurt suggests that he is ultimately not 
appealing to any form of agent-causation in order to justify the notion of 
decisive identification.35 On this point, I agree with Velleman (1992) that 
Frankfurt’s account of identification is meant to provide a reductionist account 
of agent-causation, in the sense that Frankfurt’s aim is one of defining where 
the agent stands with respect to her desires.36 However, I am additionally 
suggesting that the only way to make sense of his proposal, namely that 
decision is the element which secures freedom for higher-order volitions, is by 
introducing an active element in the agent: decisions have to be voluntaristic 
acts of the will and, as such, secure freedom.37 Unfortunately, Frankfurt (1987) 
does not provide any further explanation about where to locate such a notion 
of activity.  
In light of this, it is reasonable to conclude that Cuyper is right in claiming 
that the notion of activity, as it is used by Frankfurt, risks being in tension with 
the general naturalistic framework of his early account of freedom. Such a 
notion, if not incompatible with determinism, at least carries with it strong 
																																																						
35 Frankfurt (1971) argues at length against Chisolm’s account of free will as agent causation, 
and carefully distinguishes his proposal from these kinds of accounts. 
36 In this respect, Frankfurt’s theory of action significantly differs from standard models of 
agency, which explain actions through a causal explanation. For a standard view of this kind, 
see Davidson (1980). Frankfurt argues against this model in his 1978 paper, “The Problem of 
Action”. 
37 Frankfurt himself makes a similar remark in a later paper: “there is… a fundamental and 
ineradicable error in the very attempt to explicate being active in terms of endorsement or in 
terms of any other activity. Such attempts are manifestly bound to be circular” (Frankfurt 
2002e, 205). 
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incompatibilist intuitions.38 Since Frankfurt does not provide a more articulate 
story about decisive identification as a securing element for freedom, such a 
move could be a satisfactory reply to Watson’s objection only if one accepts the 
persistence of incompatibilist intuitions of this sort. 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Identification as Satisfaction  
 
In this section, I examine the second amendment to the notion of 
identification presented in Frankfurt (1992). In this paper, Frankfurt proposes 
to explain identification with a further concept, the one of wholehearted 
satisfaction. My aim is to show that such an attempt fails, and that the role of 
identification as a ground for freedom is not clarified in an effective way in this 
later paper. 
In his 1992 paper “The faintest passion”, Frankfurt openly rejects his earlier 
attempt to understanding identification as a kind of decision, and he looks out 
for a different approach. Once again, Frankfurt starts his enquiry by 
considering the presence of conflicts in the motivational structure of an agent.  
For Frankfurt (1971), conflicts in the agent’s motivational structure 
signalled an absence of freedom for the agent. In that paper, Frankfurt 
suggested that when a conflict occurs, the agent is not exercising freedom of 
the will, because someone exercises free will only when she wants in complete 
accordance with pertinent higher-order volitions. In Frankfurt (1992), he 
explores a different notion of identification by emphasising a new dimension 
of such a motivational conflict: that of ambivalence.  
For Frankfurt, someone is ambivalent when she is moved by incompatible 
preferences or attitudes regarding her affects, desires or other elements of her 
psychic life (Frankfurt 1992, 99). Accordingly, in Frankfurt’s terminology 
ambivalence is not related to conflicts involving first-order desires alone (they 
																																																						
38 Watson notes as well that Frankfurt stances toward compatibilism are ambiguous: “I 
should say Frankfurt's own attitude toward compatibilism is not exactly clear. There is a way 
of reading the condition that a person be 'free either to make that desire his will or to make 
some other first- order desire his will instead' in a way that is not captured by the dependency 
analysis, and he nowhere expliIcitly says that that analysis is sufficient as well as necessary for 
free will” (Watson 1987, 148). 
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“do not pertain to the will at all”). Instead, one is ambivalent with regards to 
one’s higher-order, reflective attitudes. These kinds of struggles are “conflicts 
that pertain to the will”: the will of an agent is affected by ambivalence when 
the agent is not decisively aware of what she really wants at an higher order of 
reflection.39 In other words, with ambivalence the agent is left with a specific 
psychic situation that she is not capable to endorse or, instead, reject.40 
In the spectrum of the possible psychological states of an agent, 
ambivalence is diametrically opposed to another state: wholeheartedness. 
Frankfurt says that an agent is “volitionally robust” (1992, 100) when she is 
resolved towards her higher-order attitudes, when she is, in other words, 
wholehearted in her desires, preferences and decisions. In this sense, a person 
is wholehearted when there are no conflicts or ambivalence among her higher-
order volitions. 
Wholeheartedness is clarified in Frankfurt (1992) through another notion. 
Indeed, according to Frankfurt, to be wholehearted is equivalent to the 
enjoyment of a kind of self-satisfaction. According to Frankfurt, when an agent 
is wholehearted with respect to some of her psychic elements, for example 
when she is wholehearted in some volition or attitude, she is at the same time 
“fully satisfied” with the circumstance that those motives determine her 
psychological processes. In this sense, to be fully satisfied with a particular 
psychological configuration of one’s own motivational structure means that 
one has no active interest in changing it in any way. In other words, self-
satisfaction is equivalent to a kind of absence of resistance with respect to one’s 
motives and attitudes. In Frankfurt’s words: 
 
Satisfaction with one’s self requires no adoption of any cognitive, 
attitudinal, affective, or intentional stance … Satisfaction is a state of the 
entire psychic system – a state constituted just by the absence of any 
tendency or inclination to alter its condition… Being genuinely satisfied is 
not a matter, then, of choosing to leave things as they are or of making 
																																																						
39 Note that a consequence of Frankfurt’s notion of ambivalence is that an unwilling addict, 
who stands sincerely against his addiction, is not for this reason ambivalent with regard to his 
motivation. “The unwilling addict is wholeheartedly on one side of the conflict from which he 
suffers, and not at all on the other. The addiction may defeat his will, but does not as such 
disrupt its unity” (Frankfurt 2002, 99). 
40 In chapter 3, section 3.6, I will propose a different solution to the problem of ambivalence 
by making use of my hierarchical account of freedom. 
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some judgment or decision concerning the desirability of change. It is a 
matter of simply having no interest in making changes.  
(Frankfurt 1992, 104–5) 
 
The notion of self-satisfaction also allows Frankfurt to revise the notion of 
identification. Particularly, Frankfurt now characterises identification simply as 
the endorsement of a higher-order desire with which the person is satisfied 
(Frankfurt 1992, 105). In this light, if the endorsing desire is a desire with which 
the person is satisfied, she does not need to ascend to higher orders volitions to 
secure her identification with that desire. 
 
 
2.6 Wholehearted Identification 
 
In this section, I advance a reading of Frankfurt’s notion of wholehearted 
satisfaction, that I presented in the last section. I propose to understand such a 
concept in terms of wholehearted identification (WI), and I show that (WI) does 
not work to ground freedom. 
I argue that Frankfurt (1992) makes a decisive shift from an account in 
which identification is characterised as a form of creation, to one in which 
identification is better understood as a form of discovery. According to the first 
account, the agent’s desires are her own desires because she actively endorses 
them by means of a higher-order volition or, alternatively, by means of an act 
of decision. According to this picture, identification is an act of the will. In this 
light, when one identifies with one’s desires, “they are not merely desires he 
happens to have or to find within himself, but desires that he adopts or puts 
himself behind.” In section 2.4, I proposed that such a notion of identification 
is well captured by what I called active identification. According to (AI) the 
freedom of lower-order desires is actively produced by higher-order volitions 
through the act of decisive identification. The higher-order volitions that the 
agent wants in alignment with her will are themselves free because they are 
established and produced in an active way through the act of making a 
deliberative decision. 
In his later works, however, Frankfurt emphasises a different, more 
passive notion of identification. Frankfurt (1992) indeed suggests that this more 
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passive sense of identification is sufficient to ground freedom for higher-order 
volitions and to justify the role performed by identification. According to 
Frankfurt, identification is now not performed through an active decision, but 
it is performed instead in terms of satisfaction. Satisfaction with a higher-order 
desire, in turn, is merely a matter of an absence of conflicts in the motivational 
structure of the agent. In this light, identification is neither dependent on any 
form of production or ‘creation’ of the agent’s will nor it does imply any form 
of action of the agent. On the contrary, identification is essentially a matter of 
passive discovery. In Frankfurt’s words:  
  
To be satisfied with something does not require that a person have any 
particular belief about it, nor any particular feeling or attitude or intention. 
It does not require, for instance, that he regard it as satisfactory, or that he 
accede to it with approval, or that he intend to leave it as it stands. There 
is nothing that he needs to think, or to adopt, or to accept; it is not 
necessary for him to do anything at all.  
(Frankfurt 1992, 104) 
 
In this picture, the agent identifies with her motives in a ‘passive’ way. 
Identification so understood does not presuppose any form of active or 
voluntaristic control by the agent. Nor it does presuppose a conscious 
acceptance of her volitional situation: the state of satisfaction with some psychic 
situation cannot be achieved in any active way. In what, then, does such a 
notion of identification consist? 
On this account, one identifies with desires with which one is 
wholeheartedly satisfied. In this case, what the agent recognises is that she is 
satisfied with some of her physic elements, and when she recognises that this 
is the case, she automatically identifies herself with them. In this picture, most 
of the time the agent is not even aware of her satisfaction: she is simply 
identified with most of her psychic elements exactly because she is 
wholehearted in them.41 I propose to understand such a different concept of 
																																																						
41 With these remarks, I am not suggesting that the act of discovery is a necessary element for 
identification. Indeed, most of the time the agent is not even aware of her satisfaction with a 
certain desire. However, when the agent focuses on the scrutiny of her motives in the act of 
self-reflection, she would most of the time ‘discover’ that she is satisfied with most of her 
volitions and desires. 
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identification as a wholehearted identification. Accordingly, I formulate (WI) as 
follows: 
 
(WI) Freedom for higher-order volitions is secured when the agent is 
wholeheartedly satisfied with her identification with unopposed higher-
order volitions. 
 
(WI) is meant to sufficiently ground freedom for higher-order in quite a 
new way. In this picture, what secure the agent’s freedom is not an arbitrary 
form of decisive identification with some of the agent’s higher-order desires, 
but instead the fact that one’s desires form a coherent and unitary set. 
Wholehearted identification, in this light, is fully realised in the act of recognition 
and acknowledgment of what one can wholeheartedly will. As Frankfurt notes, 
“we can only be what nature and life make us, and that is not so readily up to 
us” (Frankfurt 1992, 101). In the remainder of this section, I ask if the notion of 
(WI) succeeds in providing a grounding element for freedom and is itself 
immune to externality.  
At first glance the notions of wholeheartedness and the one of satisfaction 
suggest a very different proposal than the one provided in Frankfurt (1987). 
Satisfaction, in particular, is not a further higher-order desire or attitude but, 
on the contrary, is a state of the entire psychic system of the agent. In this sense, 
being satisfied does not mean that the agent has another endorsing higher-
order volition in her hierarchy. In contrast, when an agent is satisfied with a 
desire, she simply does not present any contrary attitude to it.42 For this reason, 
since (WI) is not a further higher order desire, it seems a good candidate to 
solve the Regress Problem.43 The main reason for this is that it removes the 
burden of securing freedom for higher-order volitions from any higher-order 
state as such. Instead, now Frankfurt chooses to understand the self not as a 
dialectic mesh between different levels of the person but as a single unity. This 
unity, of course, is still formed by different components, but in Frankfurt’s new 
proposal what matters for freedom is the unity of the system itself. In this 
picture, the agent as a psychic system needs to be internally coherent in such a 
																																																						
42 As Bratman (2002) eloquently puts it, Frankfurt’s concept of satisfaction refers in a mere 
negative manner to a “non-occurrence” (7). 
43 Cf. chapter 1, section 1.10 for a detailed discussion of the Regress Problem. 
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way that, when any lower-order desire is presented to the agent, she does not 
have any contrary higher-order attitude toward it and she is instead 
wholeheartedly satisfied with it. When this happens, the higher-order volitions 
with which the agent is satisfied are as well free, exactly because of the absence 
in the agent of any tendency to reject them.  
(WI) seems then promising in addressing the Regress Problem. 
Unfortunately, however, this concept raises two important issues. The first 
problem is that this notion itself seems to be not immune from externality. 
Indeed, it seems that under (WI) there is no clear way to distinguish between a 
free agent and a manipulated (or addicted) agent. This is a classical objection 
to hierarchical accounts of freedom, and it holds that it is possible that the 
alignment in a person’s will could be the result of a manipulation, rather than 
being the result of the organisation of the agent’s will. In other words, it is 
possible to imagine that the ‘correct mesh’ of will and volitions is implanted in 
a person from an external source (cf. for example Mele 1995).  
I argue that such an objection is not met by Frankfurt’s notion of (WI). As I 
showed in the previous section, the understanding of satisfaction is 
fundamentally self-reflective (“the fact that the person is not moved to change 
things must derive from his understanding and evaluation of how things are 
with him”, Frankfurt 1992, I05). However, if all there is to identification is self-
reflection, self-reflection can indeed be susceptible to manipulation. In other 
words, it is possible to imagine that a psychic situation of wholehearted 
satisfaction is implanted by an external manipulator, but it is still perceived by 
the agent as free and autonomous. In this case, the agent is intuitively not free 
with regard to her satisfaction with her psychic situation: her feeling of 
wholeheartedness is not genuine, but it is instead externally implanted. 
However, the agent seems to meet Frankfurt’s requirements for freedom: she 
is wholeheartedly satisfied with her psychological situation. 
The reason for this failure, and this is the second worry, concerns the lack 
of a proper ground in Frankfurt’s notion of (WI). In Frankfurt’s proposal, self-
satisfaction is what grounds the notion of (WI). Indeed, Frankfurt characterises 
identification simply as the endorsement of a higher-order desire with which 
the person is satisfied. In this light, if the endorsing desire is a desire with which 
the person is satisfied, she does not need to ascend to higher-order volitions to 
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of identification is not a further higher-order phenomenon, it does not require 
a particular explanation: what in this picture assures that the agent’s higher-
order structure is free is simply an internally coherent set of physiological 
motivations. But is satisfaction enough to ground identification? 
In the picture suggested by (WI), the agent refuses to improve her situation 
even if she might know that she could be much better off, simply because she 
is satisfied with how things are with herself. Now, this situation allows two 
interpretations. On the one hand, the agent’s acceptance can be motivated by 
the acknowledgment that her situation is “good enough” for her. On the other 
hand, however, it can simply be the result of depression or resignation. As 
Bratman (1996) points out, satisfaction with a desire “may be grounded in 
depression, and in such cases satisfaction with a desire does not seem to 
guarantee agential authority.” (204)  It seems that in this case the state of 
satisfaction with one’s motivational situation does not express the will of the 
agent, but it is just the result of her passive state of depression. Satisfaction 
consequently, as the mere absence of contrary attitudes toward a desire, is not 
enough to firmly secure agential authority. 
In light of this, it seems that the issue here is not to note that someone does 
not have any contrary attitude toward a desire, but is instead to ask why she 
does not have any. In this respect Frankfurt’s explanation of this notion seems 
incomplete. For why is an agent free if she is satisfied with certain motivations 
and not with others? Even if this process is entirely self-reflective and even 
passive, it still seems that we are left without a sense of why certain volitions 
with which the agent is wholeheartedly identified are meant to secure freedom 
for the agent.  
Frankfurt could reply to this concern by pointing out that the agent is 
generally satisfied and identified with the volitions which form her real self. 
This further characterisation could help to grasp a better sense for which 
satisfaction with certain psychic attitudes guarantees freedom for the agent. 
However, as discussed previously,44 what Frankfurt’s argument seems to lack 
is a theory of personality, which is able to explain why some of the self’s 
																																																						
44 See chapter 1, section 1.10, 37. 
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volitions - the ones with which she is satisfied through (WI) – are supposed to 
form the real self.45  
Alternatively, Frankfurt could reply by remarking that by being satisfied 
with the volitions which produce an alignment in the agent’s will, the agent is 
not particularly identified with some volitions rather than others. On the 
contrary, the agent identifies herself with her entire psychic situation. In this 
light, the agent’s will is free when there are not opposing tendencies in her 
system of motivations. But if this is the case, it seems that Bratman’s objection 
still stands: the agent’s state of satisfaction with her motivational situation 
could well be the result of a condition of depression or the like. In this sense, it 
seems that a mere negative characterization of the phenomenon of satisfaction 
is not adequate to justify a hierarchical theory of freedom.46 
 
 
2.7 Summary of the chapter 
 
In this chapter, I discussed Frankfurt’s claim that identification is sufficient 
to secure freedom. I argued that Frankfurt presents two different notions of 
identification to support his claim, and I called them Active Identification (AI) 
and Wholehearted Identification (WI).  
I explored his 1987 paper, and I suggested that Frankfurt attempts to 
ground identification with the introduction of the concept of decision. Then, I 
investigated his 1992 paper, and I showed that here Frankfurt tries to secure 
the notion of wholehearted identification with the introduction of the concept 
of satisfaction.  Through (AI) and (WI), I presented a variety of arguments to 
understand whether Frankfurt’s notion of identification could serve the 
																																																						
45 In chapter 3, I present a revised hierarchical theory of free will which goes in a similar 
direction. Indeed, I propose a criterion to distinguish between desires that are, so to speak, part 
of the ‘real self’ of the agent and desire which are not, and are, as such, external. I will motivate 
these claims by proposing a different ground for the notion of identification: the one of volitional 
identity. 
46 On a general note, Frankfurt here faces the familiar objection that was discussed 
throughout the whole dissertation: he tries to justify freedom with a particular mental 
phenomenon, satisfaction, which is itself in need of an explanation. For this reason, other 
philosophers have tried to equip satisfaction with a different basis. For example, Bratman 
(1996, 2002) argues that one is satisfied with a desire because of a reason. For Bratman, practical 
reasons can be a proper ground for agential authority. However, in Bratman’s theory what 
secures agential authority is the reason itself and not, instead, the same notion of satisfaction. 
In the next chapter, section 3.6, I will criticize Bratman’s account with regard to the role of 
practical reason, and I will advance a proposal to incorporate practical reasons in a hierarchical 
account of freedom. 
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purpose of securing freedom. However, I concluded that both approaches are 
doomed to failure and that, as such, Frankfurt’s notion of identification is not 
able to act as a ground for a hierarchical theory of freedom. 
Ultimately, my analysis of the notions of (AI) and (WI) - combined with the 
distinction between three concepts of free will presented in chapter 1 - will 
serve as a basis for a new hierarchical account of freedom that I present in the 
next chapter.
	74 
 
 
 
 
 
3  
The necessity of freedom 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Outline of the chapter 
 
 In this chapter, I present a revised hierarchical account of free will. The 
main claim of my proposal is that freedom is dependent on the agent’s 
volitional identity, which acts as a proper ground for freedom of the will. In 
section 3.2, I motivate why a hierarchical account of freedom should rest on a 
mere conformity account of free will (Def. 3) and on a notion of identification 
as satisfaction (WI). Next, in section 3.3, I present three immediate objections to 
such an account. In the rest of the chapter, I articulate my account of freedom 
and provide a reply to these objections. As a first step, I propose a different 
notion of identification, which makes use of the notion of satisfaction, but it is 
grounded in the concepts of volitional identity and caring (section 3.4). Then, 
in section 3.5, I understand such a notion of identification as a ground for a 
hierarchical account of free will: free will, in this sense, is described as the 
agent’s wholehearted identification with psychic elements which belong to her 
volitional identity. In section 3.6, I explore the problem of ambivalence in a 
hierarchical theory of freedom, and I suggest a way to overcome this 
motivational uncertainty according to my account. In section 3.7, I advance a 
proposal about the role of practical reason in a hierarchical theory of freedom. 
Finally, in section 3.8, I challenge my account by considering manipulation and 
addiction cases, and I propose an original solution to these problems.  
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3.2 A revised hierarchical theory of free will 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Frankfurt makes use of two distinct 
concepts of identification to provide a ground for his theory of freedom. The 
general claim of Frankfurt’s late proposal is that a correct account of freedom 
and autonomy rests on an adequate notion of identification. Indeed, to exercise 
free will is not just reducible to the correct mesh between agent’s volitions and 
will, but instead it is a matter of decisive identification with effective desires, while 
a lack of such identification would entail the absence of free will. For Frankfurt, 
when the agent acts on a desire with which she has identified, she is acting as 
an active and autonomous agent. On the contrary, when she acts on desires 
with which she does not identify decisively, she is acting in a passive way, 
because she is moved by desires that she considers as alien to herself.  
I suggested that Frankfurt makes use of two different notions of 
identification to explain how an agent is identified with her motives: Active 
Identification (AI) and Wholehearted Identification (WI). By making use of different 
higher-order phenomena - such as decision or satisfaction - these two concepts 
are aimed at justifying how the agent’s higher-order desires can be in 
themselves exempt from externality and, hence, count as a proper element for 
grounding freedom. To repeat, according to (AI), identification works as a 
securing element for freedom not just because it appeals to even higher levels 
in the hierarchy, but because it appeals to a decisive element of activity: 
 
(AI) Freedom for higher-order volitions is secured when the agent 
identifies herself with the second-order volitions she decides to bring to 
alignment with her will. 
 
What (AI) suggests is that the freedom of lower-order desires is actively 
produced by second-order volitions through the act of making a deliberative 
decision. The act of decision, since it is actively performed by the agent, is not 
subject to any form of externality. 
On the contrary, according to (WI) identification is simply the endorsement 
of a higher-order desire with which the person is satisfied. In this light, if the 
endorsing desire is a desire with which the person is satisfied, she does not 
need to ascend to even higher-order volitions to secure her identification with 
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that desire. I proposed to understand such a different concept of identification 
as a wholehearted identification. Accordingly, I formulated (WI) as follows: 
 
(WI) Freedom for higher-order volitions is secured when the agent is 
wholeheartedly satisfied with her identification with unopposed higher-
order volitions. 
 
According to (WI), what secures the agent’s freedom is not an arbitrary 
form of decisive identification with some of the agent’s higher-order desires, 
but instead the fact that desires form a coherent and unitary set. Wholehearted 
identification, in this light, is fully realised in the act of discovery and recognition 
of what one can wholeheartedly will. 
In this section, I ask how the notions of (AI) and (WI) work when applied 
to Frankfurt’s (1971) original theory of free will. The aim of this move is to 
further investigate the role of the notion of identification in a hierarchical 
theory of free will. The result of this enquiry will show that a hierarchical 
theory of freedom correctly rests on the notion of identification, when such a 
concept is justified by the right grounding element. 
In chapter one, I argued that Frankfurt (1971) does not present a unitary 
definition of free will, but instead is ambiguous between three different 
concepts of free will: 
 
(Def. 1) Free will as counterfactual causation. A person exercises free will if 
she is free to have the will she wants, and she could have constituted her 
will otherwise than she did. 
 
(Def. 2) Free will as actual causation A person exercises free will if she has the 
will she wants because it is the will she wants to have, and she has no 
interest in changing it.  
 
(Def. 3) Free will as mere conformity. A person exercises free will when she 
has the will she wants, even if she has no causal control over her will. 
 
For the purposes of my argument, the difference between the three 
definitions of free will can be expressed by noticing that (Def. 1) and (Def.2) 
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suggest that there should be a causal relation between higher and lower 
motivational elements of the agent – higher level motivational elements should 
causally produce the lower level ones. On the contrary, (Def. 3) does not have 
to respect this condition: (Def. 3) suggests that to exercise free will higher-order 
volitions should be merely in accord with the will of an agent.  
Now, as Watson’s objection clearly shows, a hierarchical account of free 
will can work only if one is able to motivate which element in the agent’s 
motivational structure is responsible for securing freedom for the higher-order 
volitions of the agent and, in turn, for the agent’s will. The notion of 
identification seems very promising in this respect. However, I showed in 
chapter 2 that both the notions of identification put forward by Frankfurt are 
not exempt from structural problems, and, as such, they are not able to perform 
this task.  
Frankfurt (1992) seems to sketch a possible reply to the question I am trying 
to answer, that is, what are the implications of the different notions of 
identification when applied to the concept of free will. Particularly, in this 
crucial passage, Frankfurt provides us with a sketch of how the shift from an 
account of decision to an account of wholeheartedness reflects on his theory of 
free will presented in his 1971 paper. Let me quote Frankfurt at length here: 
 
When the chips are down [a person] may discover that he is not, after all, 
decisively moved by the preference or motive he supposed he had adopted 
…We cannot have, simply for the asking, whatever will we want … This 
may appear in conflict with the notion that our wills are ultimately free. 
But what is the freedom of the will? A natural and useful way of 
understanding it is that a person's will is free to the extent that he has 
whatever will he wants. Now if this means that his will is free only if it is 
under his entirely unmediated voluntaristic control, then a free will can 
have no genuine reality; for reality entails resistance to such control. Must 
we, then, regard our wills either as unfree or as unreal? The dilemma can 
be avoided if we construe the freedom of someone’s will as requiring, not 
that he originate or control what he wills, but that he be wholehearted in 
it. If there is no division within a person’s will, it follows that the will he has 
is the will he wants. His wholeheartedness means exactly that there is in him 
no endogenous desire to be volitionally different than he is. Although he 
may be unable to create in himself a will other than the one he has, his will 
is free at least in the sense that he himself does not oppose or impede it.  
(Frankfurt 1992, p. 101-102, my emphasis) 
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To have a better understanding of Frankfurt’s claims, I suggest looking 
back at the different concepts of free will at work in his 1971 article. In chapter 
one, I suggested that Frankfurt’s (1971) theory of free will is equivocal between 
two general meanings of free will, which in turn give rise to the three different 
concepts of free will, restated above. According to my analysis, Frankfurt’s 
original theory is ambiguous between two meanings of free will: 
 
a)  a person possesses free will if she is free to want what she wants to 
want. 
b)  a person possesses free will if she wants what she wants to want  
 
In the quoted passage, Frankfurt notes that his previous attempts to 
characterize free will as being free to have the will one wants, that is, as meaning 
(a), are doomed to failure. The reason for this, Frankfurt says, is that to justify 
such an account and to reply to obvious objections to it one ultimately needs to 
resort to a form of voluntaristic and unmediated control. On the contrary, the 
weaker requirement of wholehearted satisfaction seems to suggest an 
alternative conception of freedom. In particular, Frankfurt is now advising 
favouring meaning (b) of free will, according to which free will is the freedom 
of simply wanting what one wants to want.  
I consider Frankfurt’s giving up on meaning (a) of free will a consequence 
of the failure of the notion of (AI). I am going to show why. Let us consider the 
definition of free will which best suits meaning (a), that is (Def. 1). According 
to it, a person exercises free will if she is free to have the will she wants, and 
she could have constituted her will otherwise than she did. To endorse (Def. 1), 
it is indeed necessary to respect two different conditions: 
 
(i)  Internal control. In the actual scenario, the agent is free to have the will 
she wants. This means that there should be a particular relation between 
second-lever desires and first-level ones, namely that the second-level 
desires should causally produce the first-level ones.   
 
(ii) Counterfactual control. Moreover, such a relation has to be confirmed as 
well in a counterfactual scenario. To be free, the agent “could have done 
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otherwise than constitute the will as he did.” That is, if the agent had 
wanted to want otherwise, she would have wanted otherwise.  
 
By abandoning meaning (a) of free will, what Frankfurt is denying is that 
it is possible for an agent to actively exercise any form of internal or 
counterfactual control on her will. Such a kind of control, Frankfurt suggests, 
is not coherent with the reality outside us (“Indeed, the concept of reality 
entails the existence of something which is independent of our desires and 
wishes, and which, as such, constrains us”, Frankfurt 1992, 100). A person, 
Frankfurt now says, cannot shape her will as she likes by a psychic movement 
that is fully under her immediate voluntary control (Frankfurt 1992, 1993, 
1999b). 
But how does Frankfurt reach such a conclusion? For the purposes of my 
argument, let us focus on the requirement of internal control. The latter 
condition suggests that an agent exercises free will if her second-level desires 
causally produce the first-level ones. As shown in chapter one, however, such 
a definition of free will is challenged by Watson-style objections. To repeat, 
Watson argues that, in order for such a definition to work, one has to explain 
why freedom for the agent is justified by the higher-level volitions’ role. As 
shown in chapter 2, section 2.2, Frankfurt tries to find a justification for his 
claim in the notion of identification. In particular, adopting (AI), Frankfurt 
suggests that the higher-level volitions guarantee freedom for the agent 
because she is able to decide, with regards to her higher-order volitions, which 
one will form her effective will. Decisions about higher-order volitions, 
Frankfurt suggests, are acts of the will, and as such are exempt from externality.  
Internal control, in this picture, is then secured by the act of decisive 
identification of the agent with a higher-order volition, which is in turn justified 
by the agent’s decision about it. However, I argued in chapter 2, section 2.4 that 
the only way to coherently make sense of this proposal is by introducing an 
active and voluntaristic element in the agent: only in this way decisions are able 
to secure freedom. What Frankfurt is denying in the quoted passage, however, 
is precisely that the agents’ wills can be made free by any act of voluntaristic 
decision. As a matter of fact, Frankfurt now suggests that agents cannot simply 
originate or control their wills, and that free will has much more to do with the 
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agents being wholehearted in their wills and satisfied with their motivational 
structure. 
It seems to me that the most natural way to interpret Frankfurt’s claims is 
to say that to exercise free will, one does not need to be free to have the will one 
wants, as (Def.1) or (Def.2) suggest. On the contrary, it is sufficient that the will 
one has is the will one wants. Such a conception - as I argued in chapter 1, 
section 1.4.3 - is best captured by (Def.3) of free will, according to which a 
person exercises free will when her higher-order volitions simply align with 
her will, even if she could not have created the alignment or had another will 
instead. At the same time, Frankfurt suggests that meaning (b) of free will, that 
is, that a person possesses free will if she wants what she wants to want, is best 
suited to account for the weaker requirement of wholehearted satisfaction, that 
is, to the conception of identification that I called (WI).  
In light of this, my aim in this chapter is to propose a revised hierarchical 
theory of free will by making use of (Def. 3). At the same time, I suggest that a 
coherent analysis of free will based on (Def.3) can rely only on a notion of 
identification as Wholehearted Satisfaction. (Def. 3) suggests that free will is better 
understood as a mere conformity between the higher-order volitions of an 
agent and her will: if they align, the person exercises free will. That is, if the 
person finds herself identified with aligned volitions, she is acting with a free 
will. So understood, (Def. 3) and (WI) jointly conjure to provide the following 
further definition of free will: 
 
(Def. 4) Free will as self-satisfaction: A person exercises free will if she is 
wholeheartedly satisfied with her identification with reflective elements of 
her psychic system, and she has no interest in changing them. 
 
According to (Def. 4), a person exercises free will in a reflective and even 
passive way: the person’s will is free exactly when she just finds herself 
wholeheartedly satisfied with the will she has, and she has no interest in 
changing her psychic situation. In this picture, free will is essentially a matter 
of complete and wholehearted satisfaction with regards to one's effective 
motivational structure. 
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3.3 Free will and satisfaction: an ostensible contradiction 
 
The psychological picture suggested by (Def. 4) and, more generally, by the 
notion of satisfaction with one’s motivational system, is in some respects quite 
realistic. Indeed, most of the time, agents show an attitude of satisfaction with 
the state of their motivational system: they act constantly on various desires 
and, if asked, they are confident in endorsing these desires at a higher-order of 
reflection.  
To see how this happens, consider the following example. A few times per 
week, Susy loves to go out and eat junk food. When asked about her unhealthy 
habit, she is very confident about her reply: she loves the taste of it, and she 
thinks that to enjoy life and fulfil one’s desires is more important than caring 
about one’s health. She does this out of reflection and her desire to keep eating 
junk food is freely willed.  
In terms of the account of free will suggested by (Def. 4), Susy is indeed 
exercising free will. Susy has a first-order desire to eat junk food. At the same 
time, when she reflects on her motivational system, she finds in herself an 
alignment between her higher-order volitions and her first-order desires: she 
identifies herself with the second-order desire to keep desiring junk food and 
she is satisfied with her identification. As a matter of fact, she has no interest in 
changing her psychic situation, and she is wholeheartedly grounded in her 
volitions.  
However, as discussed in chapter 2, section 2.6, the notion of satisfaction 
suffers from different problems, and it is not clear whether it is a proper 
candidate to justify identification. In the same way, it seems that, as a definition 
of free will based on the notion of satisfaction, (Def. 4) is immediately at odds 
with an acceptable conception of free will. Such an account, indeed, seems to 
raise at least three problems: 
 
a. It conveys an idea of passivity which seems to conflict with an 
acceptable conception of free will. 
b. It is not clear if satisfaction, as it is employed in (Def.4), is sufficient 
to ground identification and free will. 
c. It is not clear how to handle cases of manipulation and addiction under 
(Def.4). 
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I begin by considering objection (a). According to this concern, Frankfurt’s 
characterisation of satisfaction is at odds with free will since it seems to refer to 
a sort of passivity with regard to what moves one to action. In other words, the 
agent described by Frankfurt might know that she could improve her situation 
but she does not do anything to reach such an end because she is satisfied with 
the way things are. Now, the state of acceptance of one’s motivational situation 
can derive from the appraisal that one’s situation is ‘good enough’, and thus it 
does not require an intervention to improve it. However, as Bratman suggests, 
satisfaction can easily be the result of a state of depression or resignation. In 
this case, it is hard to see how satisfaction can express what the agent really 
wants, or as Bratman puts it, his authority as an agent. (“Why would that not 
suffice for identification? The answer is that one may leave things as they are 
because of some sort of enervation or exhaustion or depression or the like”, 
Bratman 1996, 7) 
In the example above, Susy endorses her first-order desire to eat junk food 
just because she is satisfied with it. However, this does not imply in any way 
an active commitment from her side to endorse a particular volition as the one 
she wants to be part of her effective will. Indeed, Susy’s desire to eat junk food 
could easily be the result of a state of resignation or depression, and as such, 
could not express what Susy really wants.  
Objection (b), as a consequence, states that satisfaction as the mere non-
occurrence of negative attitudes toward a desire is insufficient to ground 
identification and free will. Since satisfaction can be the result of an altered 
psychic state such as depression or resignation, it seems that to claim that 
someone does not have any negative attitude toward a desire is insufficient to 
assure that her volitions are freely willed. For this reason, the real issue here is 
not that someone does not have any negative attitudes toward a desire, but 
rather why she does not have any. In this respect Frankfurt’s explanation of this 
notion seems incomplete. For why is an agent free if she is satisfied with certain 
motivations and not with others? Even if this process is entirely self-reflective 
and even passive, it still seems that we are left without a sense of why certain 
volitions with which the agent is wholeheartedly identified are meant to secure 
freedom for the agent. 
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Finally, objection (c) suggests a further unpalatable consequence of the 
agent’s passivity under (Def. 4). Namely, that it is not easy to distinguish 
between a free agent and an addicted or manipulated one. In the example, it is 
possible to imagine that Susy’s second-order volition to keep desiring junk food 
is implanted from an external source, or that it can be the result of an addiction. 
In these cases, it seems difficult to claim that Susy is actually exercising free 
will. 
Overall, it seems that a conception of free will based on Frankfurt’s notion 
of satisfaction is strongly challenged by these objections. In the next sections, I 
will offer a reply to these objections by adding further elements as an 
appropriate ground for the notion of identification as satisfaction. My aim is to 
give at least some justifications for a theory of free will based on such a notion. 
In section 3.3, I reply to objection (b) by proposing an account of identification 
based on the notion of satisfaction, and grounded in the notions of volitional 
identity and caring. As a result, I propose the introduction of volitional identity 
as a new element to ground identification and free will. In sections 3.4, I argue 
that the structure of the will described in the previous section justifies a 
hierarchical account of free will based on the notion of satisfaction, and I 
present such an account. In section 3.5, I explore the problem of ambivalence 
and suggest a possible solution to it, and I offer at the same time an answer to 
objection (a). In section 3.6, I sketch a role for practical reason in my account. 
Finally, in section 3.7, I consider how my account of free will is able to deal with 
objection (c), that is, how it distinguishes between a free agent and an addicted 
or manipulated one. 
 
 
3.4 Identification, caring and volitional identity 
 
In this section, I argue that it is possible to make use of identification as 
satisfaction to build an adequate account of free will on (Def.4), by taking into 
account Frankfurt’s notions of caring, love and volitional identity. These 
phenomena, if appropriately connected, can provide the necessary ground to 
explain why most of the time agents do not have any negative attitudes toward 
their desires; moreover, they explain why the agent endorses at a higher-level 
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of reflection some of her desires and not others, and why her identification and 
satisfaction with them implies that her desires are freely willed. 
In a nutshell, my claim is as follows: the agent’s ability to care and love 
shapes her volitional identity. Volitional identity characterised as such grounds 
the notion of identification based on satisfaction (WI) as a securing element for 
freedom of the will. For this reason, satisfaction appropriately justifies (Def. 4). 
I begin by analysing Frankfurt’s notions of caring and love as he presents 
them in Frankfurt (1982, 1999). The concept of caring becomes particularly 
important in Frankfurt’s later works. For Frankfurt, caring is the fundamental 
guiding principle of human actions. Furthermore, love is for Frankfurt the most 
important kind of caring and, as such, it plays an important role in 
understanding human agency. But what do caring and love exactly mean for 
Frankfurt? 
Frankfurt (1982, 85) provides the first definition of caring: 
 
As for the notion of what a person cares about, it coincides in part with the 
notion of something with reference to which the person guides himself in 
what he does with his life and in his conduct … [Caring is] constituted by 
a complex set of cognitive, affective and volitional dispositions and states. 
 
According to Frankfurt, caring is a composite disposition which guides the 
agent through her life, by means of providing her with the ability of “giving 
particular attention” (83) to certain things and directing her behaviour 
accordingly toward what she cares about. In the quoted passage, Frankfurt 
seems to claim that caring about something requires the presence of related 
emotions or beliefs. However, In Frankfurt (1993, 1999), he claims that it is not 
necessary to have any emotion or belief to care about something and that caring 
necessarily implies only a volitional element (“This is not primarily either a 
cognitive or an affective matter… Caring is essentially volitional; that is, it 
concerns one's will”, 1993, 110). 
Frankfurt (1999) explains what caring means by comparing it both with 
wanting something and finding something valuable.47 An agent can have a 
strong desire for something, for example, the desire to eat junk food. However, 
to have the desire for something does not imply that an agent cares about it. 
																																																						
47 See for example Frankfurt (1999b, 158).  
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Indeed, even if such a desire is strongly present in the motivational structure 
of the agent, she can care more about other things. For example, she can avoid 
eating junk food because she is worried about her health, and she cares about 
it. At the same time, it is also possible that an agent is willing to recognise that 
something is inherently valuable, for example doing exercise. However, such a 
thing is not something which the agent cares about. In this case, even if the 
agent is aware of the intrinsic value of exercising, she simply is not moved to 
act on such a consideration because she does not find it significant for her at 
all.48 In this light, according to Frankfurt, to care about something means that 
something is in some respect significant for the agent, that she finds it important 
in guiding her conduct and actions. 
Caring and wanting also differ in another significant respect. Indeed, one 
of the most important characteristics of caring is that it has a temporal aspect 
(“[T]he outlook of a person who cares about something is inherently 
prospective: that is, he necessarily considers himself as having a future”, 
Frankfurt 1999, 83). It is possible for an agent to have desires and even beliefs 
without recognising them as elements integrated with her persisting 
psychological structure. In other words, having a desire or a belief does not 
entail that such a desire or belief will persist for a certain period of time. On the 
contrary, it is essential to the nature of caring that it persists for more than a 
single moment, and extends itself toward the future. 
In this respect, caring also differs from satisfaction: according to Frankfurt, 
being satisfied with a desire means that the agent does not have any negative 
higher-order attitudes toward that desire in her motivational system. The role 
of caring, then, is one of extending satisfaction toward the temporally extended 
presence of a particular desire with which the agent is satisfied. 
The ability of caring also contrasts significantly from voluntary acts of will, 
such as intentions, choices or decisions. Frankfurt (1982) recognises that the 
importance of such acts for the formation of a person’s will is often excessive: 
 
This would hardly be worth pointing out except that an exaggerated 
significance is sometimes ascribed to decisions, as well as to choices and to 
																																																						
48 One consequence of this distinction is that for Frankfurt value is in itself subjective. In his 
account, the value of the object that one loves and cares about derives from her caring about it. 
In this sense, it does not possess an objective value. Susan Wolf criticizes Frankfurt’s concept 
of caring, and especially his subjectivist conception of value in (Wolf 2002, 227-244). 
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other similar "acts of will." If we consider that a person's will is that by 
which he moves himself, then what he cares about is far more germane to 
the character of his will than the decisions or choices he makes. The latter 
may pertain to what he intends to be his will, but not necessarily to what 
his will truly is.  
(Frankfurt 1982, 84) 
 
In the quoted passage, Frankfurt says that what persons care about is more 
central to their will than acts of the will as decisions or intentions, because what 
someone cares about delineates what his will truly is. As argued in chapter 2, 
section 2.3, Frankfurt had previously emphasised the importance of decisive 
commitment and decision when explaining identification and autonomy 
(Frankfurt 1971, 1975, 1977, 1987). Now, with the introduction of the concept of 
satisfaction, and then, with the notion of caring he claims, on the contrary, that 
the most important part of the will is something that agents cannot directly 
control or endorse: 
 
The formation of a person's will is most fundamentally a matter of his 
coming to care about certain things, and of his coming to care about some 
of them more than about others.  
(Frankfurt 1982, 91) 
 
Our essential natures as individuals are constituted, accordingly, by what 
we cannot help caring about. The necessities of love … mark our volitional 
limits, and thus they delineate our shapes as persons.  
(Frankfurt 1993, 138) 
 
The role ascribed to caring by Frankfurt is thus quite fundamental. 
According to him, caring is an involuntary disposition which is proper to 
human persons. As such, caring guides the agent through her life, by means of 
providing her with the ability to give particular attention to certain things. The 
result of this process is a crucial one: the formation of a person’s will. By caring 
about and loving different things over time, the agent’s will is gradually and 
spontaneously shaped and, as such, it determines the effective activities of the 
agent in her volitional and agential life. The role of caring, then, is the 
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fundamental one of delineating the boundaries of a person’s will, or, in other 
words, the limits of her volitional essence. But what does it mean, in Frankfurt’s 
hierarchical terminology, to define the shape of a person’s will?  
For Frankfurt, a person is characterised by her ability to self-reflect about 
her motivational situation, and such an ability is realised in the formation of 
higher-order volitions. Such volitions, in turn, form the essential nature of a 
person: 
 
The essential nature of a person is constituted by his necessary personal 
characteristics … They are especially characteristics of his will ... The 
personal characteristics of someone's will are reflexive, or higher-order, 
volitional features.  
(Frankfurt 1993, 113) 
 
Understood in this light, then, caring is not just simply a part of reflective 
self-evaluation of an agent or one more type of higher-order element which can 
justify the hierarchical organization of the will. On the contrary, caring is 
configured as the ability required in order to form higher-order desires and 
volitions. In other words, caring seems to be the ability which can ground the 
higher-order and self-reflective capacity of human persons. In this light, agents 
are able to form higher-order desires because they are able to care.  
As a consequence, caring and love shape what Frankfurt considers the 
volitional identity of an agent. Frankfurt says that the volitional essence of a 
person is constituted by her higher-order, volitional features. As I am 
suggesting, however, such higher-order level of reflection is in turn grounded 
in the person’s ability to care about different things. As a consequence, the 
essential nature, or volitional identity, of a person is accordingly constituted 
and shaped by what she “cannot help caring about”, or, in other words, by 
things that come spontaneously to be important to her. 
 
About certain things that are important to her, a person may care in such a 
way that she is subject to a kind of necessity. Indeed, Frankfurt says that there 
is a particular kind of necessity which is strictly linked to the configuration of 
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a person’s will.49 Frankfurt (1982), for example, presents the so-called Luther 
case. When Martin Luther was charged with heresy, he was offered an 
opportunity to recant by rejecting his heretical writings. However, he refused 
to do so, stating “Here I stand; I can do no other.” In this case, the configuration 
of Luther’s will prevents him from recanting. Even if he may intend to recant, 
he is subject to a volitional necessity, and he will inevitably fail to do so.50 
According to Frankfurt, Luther thereby discovers the boundaries of his will, 
which shape his volitional identity: 
 
When a person is subject to this sort of volitional necessity, it renders 
certain actions unthinkable for him. These actions are not genuinely among 
his options. He cannot perform any of them… he cannot will to perform 
them… If he attempts to do so, he runs up against the limits of his will.  
(Frankfurt 1993, p. 111) 
 
The young man in Sartre's famous example is another instance of what a 
volitional necessity is. The young man resolves his dilemma, concerning 
whether to remain at home and look after his mother or to abandon her and 
join the fight against his country's enemies, by making a “radically free choice”. 
However, according to Frankfurt (1982, 85) 
 
He might discover, when the chips are down, that he simply cannot bring 
himself to pursue the course of action upon which he has decided. Without 
changing his mind or forgetting anything, he might find either that he is 
moved irresistibly to pursue the other course of action instead or that he is 
similarly constrained at least to forbear from the course he has chosen ... 
That is, he might discover that he does not have and that he does not 
subsequently develop the feelings, attitudes, and interests constitutive of 
the sort of person which his decision has committed him to being.  
 
The description of the young man’s situation suggests that it is not 
sufficient to form a higher-order volition about how one wants his will to be 
																																																						
49 The concept of volitional necessity is also discussed by Gary Watson. See Watson (2004), 
88-122. 
50 Rober Kane claims that it is not true that Luther cannot change his mind about his beliefs. 
Indeed, Kane (1996) argues that Luther did have such an ability in his past. In this scenario, his 
moral responsibility and free will actually depends on Luther’s (past) ability to act otherwise.  
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effective or even to commit oneself to a decision about it. Indeed, it could be 
that his higher-order volition is not integrated with other elements of his 
motivational structure, that is, he does not develop the appropriate attitudes, 
feelings or intentions to sustain and maintain his decision. In other words, that 
decision, based on some higher-order reflection, is clearly not part of the man’s 
volitional identity: as such, it is impossible for him to fulfil his volitions just 
because he made a decision about his will. That decision is not between the 
things the man really cares about and, as such, he is not able to change is 
effective will accordingly. 
 
 
3.5 Freedom as satisfaction with one’s volitional identity 
 
In this section, I argue that the structure of the will described in the 
previous section justifies an account of freedom of the will based on the notion 
of satisfaction (Def. 4). 
It is possible to understand the young man’s situation or Luther’s situation 
in terms of Frankfurt’s notion of satisfaction. In the case of the young man, he 
is not able to pursue his higher-order decision about his motives because he is 
not truly satisfied with the presence of that particular volition in his 
motivational identity. In Frankfurt’s (1992) terminology, he is not 
wholehearted in that volition or decision and he is not satisfied with his will’s 
configuration. Similarly, Luther is completely satisfied with the configuration 
of his will, and he is as such wholehearted in his volitions. Let us now recall 
(Def. 4): 
 
(Def. 4) Free will as self-satisfaction: A person exercises free will if she is 
wholeheartedly satisfied with her identification with reflective elements of 
her psychic system, and she has no interest in changing them. 
 
According to (Def.4), a person exercises free will when she is 
wholeheartedly satisfied with her effective will, and she reflectively identifies 
herself with higher-order elements of her psychic system which are in line with 
her will. 
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I propose to analyse the situation of the young man and the one of Luther 
by making use of (Def. 4). Accordingly, they reflect two opposite outcomes. 
Sartre’s young man is not exercising free will according to (Def.4), because he 
is not wholeheartedly satisfied with his decision: he cannot bring himself to act 
on it, or he might find himself able to perform the action he has chosen, “but 
only by forcing himself to do so against powerful and persistent natural 
inclinations” (85). Luther, on the other hand, is exercising free will according 
to (Def.4): the impossibility to recant is wholeheartedly endorsed by Luther, 
and he is satisfied with the configuration of his will exactly because he 
surrenders to a volitional necessity. 
In light of this, what both cases suggest is that one exercises free will when 
he identifies himself with a higher-order volition, or with an element of his 
psychic system, if this element is part of his volitional identity. The fact that a 
higher-order volition belongs to the volitional identity of an agent justifies that 
the agent is satisfied with his identification with it and that he has no interest 
in making changes to his will. I propose to make use of Frankfurt’s (1971) early 
theory of free will to explain how my proposal works. 
At a lower level of volitional organisation, the agent possesses various and 
random desires. They derive from different factors, such as environmental 
stimuli, or the agent’s biological constitution. 
At a higher-level of reflection, the agent forms higher-order volitions in the 
act of reflection on her motivational situation. However, as argued in section 
3.3, agents are able to form higher-order desires because they are able to care: 
in this sense, their will is shaped by what they come to care about during their 
life. More precisely, they form some of their second-order desires in line with 
what they care about. For this reason, some of the agents’ higher-order volitions 
form their volitional identity .51 
What (Def. 4) suggests, then, is that an agent usually identifies herself with 
first-order desires that are in line with the higher-order volitions which form 
																																																						
51 I follow Frankfurt in claiming that volitional identity is essentially formed by higher-order 
desires and volitions (“The essential nature of a person is constituted by his necessary personal 
characteristics … They are especially characteristics of his will ... The personal characteristics 
of someone's will are reflexive, or higher-order, volitional features.” Frankfurt 1993, 113). One 
consequence of this claim is that in my hierarchical account the higher-order volitions perform 
a fundamental role, the one of shaping the volitional identity of the agent. For this reason, even 
if in my account the higher-order volitions do not directly cause the lower-level ones, they are 
nonetheless essential in order to motivate freedom of the will.  
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her volitional identity: the agent exercises free will when she acts on desires 
with which she is wholeheartedly satisfied, and she is satisfied with them 
because they are part of her volitional identity. When she acts on first-order 
desires that are not aligned with her volitional identity, she does not exercise 
free will. By making use of the ground provided by the notion of volitional 
identity, (Def.4) can be further enhanced as follows: 
 
(Def. 4.1) Free will as satisfaction with one’s volitional identity: A person 
exercises free will when she is satisfied with her identification with psychic 
elements which belong to her volitional identity, and she has no interest in 
changing them. 
 
According to (Def. 4.1), then, freedom of the will is grounded in the 
volitional identity of an agent, which is in turn secured by her ability to 
wholeheartedly care and love. 52 
 
In the rest of the section, I consider one potential complication for my 
proposal and I motivate how my account replies to objection (b), presented in 
section 3.3.53  
One possible problem for my account lies in the possibility for agents of 
acting upon various psychological elements, which are not immediately related 
to higher-order volitions. For example, let us consider again the case of Sartre’s 
young man and his dilemma, concerning whether to remain at home and look 
after his mother or to abandon her and join the fight against his country's 
enemies. What if the young man does not leave his home out of a different 
psychological element, for example, fear? It seems that in this scenario his 
decision is not taken according to his volitions, but out of a complete different 
emotion. Does his action count as free according to my account?   
I suggest that here two possibilities stand. One the one hand, it is possible 
that the fear and the young man’s volitional identity are not in line. In this 
scenario, the young man’s higher-order volitions are in line with the will to 
leave. However, because of fear, the man decides not to go. In this case, the 
																																																						
52 In his (1982), Frankfurt claims something similar when he writes that a “person acts 
autonomously only when his volitions derive from the essential character of his will” (132). 
However, he does not provide any argument or explanation to motivate this intuition. 
53 See above, 68-69. 
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action does not count as free, because the fear prevents him from acting on 
volitions which are part of his volitional identity. On the other hand, it is 
possible that the fear and the volitional identity go in the same direction. In this 
scenario, the man does not leave out of fear either. However, upon reflection, 
he discovers that he does not have a higher-order volition to leave. In this case, 
his action of not leaving counts as free, because he is acting in line with higher-
order volitions which are part of his volitional identity.54 
I consider now a more general concern. I am going to ask if my account is 
adequate to reply to objection (b) (section 3.3.), that is, to provide a suitable 
ground for freedom of the will. Let us recall the objection briefly. According to 
objection (b), satisfaction as the mere non-occurrence of negative attitudes 
toward a desire is insufficient to ground identification and free will. Indeed, 
following Watson-style objections, one can ask why the fact that an agent is 
wholeheartedly satisfied with some higher-order desires is meant to secure 
freedom for the agent.55  
In a nutshell, I suggest that identification as satisfaction can serve as the 
securing element for freedom of the will if it is grounded in the concept of 
volitional identity (Def. 4.1). In order to further motivate my claim, let me 
briefly recall why it is important to find a grounding element to motivate an 
account of freedom of the will. According to the understanding of the free will 
problem that I advanced throughout this dissertation, the main question about 
freedom can be described as a question about which elements ground the 
ability to exercise free will.56 In this light, then, to ask what grounds freedom of 
the will means to ask what circumstance or condition can make the case that 
the agent is exercising freedom. In other words, when we ask if an agent is 
choosing freely, what we want to find is one or more conditions in virtue of 
which her choice is a free one. My analysis suggests that what is missing in 
Frankfurt’s account is exactly a proper ground for the notion of satisfaction 
																																																						
54 On a general note, it is possible to argue that an element of uncertainty remains, because it 
is not always possible to easily distinguish between volitions and other emotions which 
motivate an action. However, my answer still stands, as it is not the fear - or any other emotion 
- in itself which determines whether an action is or is not free. 
55 See above section 3.2, 69. 
56 I understand grounding in the sense suggested by Sartorio (2016a, 8): “’grounding’ [is a] 
placeholder for some relation of non-causal, ontological dependence between facts in light of 
which it makes sense to say that certain facts are more basic or more fundamental than others, 
in that those other facts obtain because of, or in virtue of, them”. 
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and, in turn, for freedom.57 My aim, then, is to argue that volitional identity 
provides such a ground, and help explain why an agent exercises free will 
when she is satisfied with her motivational situation. 
To see if this is the case, I ask if my proposal is as well affected by Watson-
style objections, as it is arguably the case with Frankfurt’s original notion of 
satisfaction. I am going to show that the answer is negative. According to my 
suggestion, the agent’s exercising a free will when she is wholeheartedly 
identified with her desires is not secured by the mere fact that she endorses a 
particular higher-order desire with a decisive commitment, or by her 
satisfaction with her higher-order volitions. Such answers, as showed 
throughout the dissertation, are not suitable replies to Watson’s objection 
because they merely push the objection one step further.  
On the contrary, according to my proposal, an agent is free when she is 
identified with a desire because such a desire is part of her volitional identity, 
which is in turn shaped by her higher-order reflection about what she cares and 
loves. The agent’s desires can ground freedom of the will not simply because 
they are higher in the hierarchical structure of the will, or because the agent is 
satisfied with them, but because they are ‘essential’ to the subject’s volitional 
identity. Such a volitional identity is so powerful to impede the agent from 
identifying with desires which are not part of her volitional identity. For the 
agent to identify with some desires and not with others is, indeed, a kind of 
necessity, a volitional necessity. In the picture I am suggesting, the agent is 
usually satisfied only with desires that are part of her volitional identity. In this 
light, volitional identity allows one to avoid any risk of arbitrariness when 
motivating the agent’s identification with some of her desires.  In the rest of the 
chapter, I will further motivate my claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
57 See also Bratman (1996) for a similar concern about the lack of grounding in Frankfurt’s 
theory of freedom. 
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3.6 The problem of ambivalence 
 
In this section, I explore the problem of ambivalence in a hierarchical 
theory of freedom, and I suggest a way to overcome this motivational 
uncertainty according to my account.  
Frankfurt (1992) characterizes ambivalence as a kind of “disease” which 
paralyses the motivational structure of an agent: 
 
Insofar as someone is ambivalent, he is moved by incompatible 
preferences or attitudes regarding his affects or his desires or regarding 
other elements of his psychic life. This volitional division keeps him from 
settling upon or from tolerating any coherent affective or motivational 
identity. It means that he does not know what he really wants.  
(Frankfurt 1992, 99) 
 
What this passage suggests is that ambivalence only arises out of a person's 
higher-order, reflective attitudes. On the one hand, the reflective volitions are 
manifestly opposed in the agent’s psychological situation; on the other hand, 
they are both internal to a person's will and not “alien” to him. For this reasons, 
the presence of a conflict in the higher-order level of the person prevents her 
from forming a motivational identity with which she is satisfied. 
It is a matter of fact that often an agent can be unsatisfied with the 
configuration of her will or be uncertain about what she really wants at an 
higher-level of reflection. If this happens, there are two possibilities. First, the 
agent can act on her first-order desire and, in this case, according to (Def. 4.1) 
her will is not free because there is, in her motivational system, a higher-order 
volition which is opposed to that first-order desire. Secondly, however, the 
agent can try to change the configuration of her effective will by identifying 
herself, at a higher-level of reflection, with an opposed higher-order volition. 
The aim of the process would be one of securing that the agent’s desires are 
freely willed and are aligned again, or that, in Frankfurt’s words, the agent 
wants what she wants to want.58 
																																																						
58 In Frankfurt’s perspective at that time, the presence of this ability is fundamental, because 
it is necessary for distinguishing between an addicted, or manipulated agent, who cannot bring 
in line her motivations, and a free agent, who is always able to do so. According to Stump 
(1988), for Frankfurt an agent exercises free will only if she has the first-order volitions she has 
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Frankfurt’s explanation of this phenomenon in 1971 involved assuming 
that there should be a dependency relation between higher-level desires and 
lower-level ones: if the agent wants, she can bring in alignment her first-order 
desires by making a decisive commitment toward one of her second-order 
volitions. In terms of my definitions of free will, the will of an agent is free if 
she is able to causally produce the alignment via internal control (Def.1 or 
Def.2). To explain this process, and to reply to Watson’s objections, Frankfurt 
makes use of different higher-order phenomena, such as decisive identification 
or decision and commitment. However, as I argued in chapter 2, these attempts 
are doomed to failure and Frankfurt himself now rejects such a view.59 
How, then, is it coherently possible for the agent to overcome ambivalence 
in an account of the will based on the notion of satisfaction? According to 
Frankfurt (1992, 100): 
 
Since ambivalence is not a cognitive deficiency, … it cannot be overcome 
voluntaristically. A person cannot make himself volitionally determinate 
and thereby create a truth where there was none before, merely by an “act 
of will.” In other words, he cannot make himself wholehearted just by a 
psychic movement that is fully under his immediate voluntary control.  
 
However, the absence of any effort on the agent’s part to make herself 
wholehearted is problematic. Indeed, according to this picture, Frankfurt’s 
notion of satisfaction seems to be too passive, and not able to account for 
changes in the will of an agent which result in the possession of a free will.  Yet, 
it seems that if an agent is ambivalent, she can be able to make up her mind 
about how she wants to be motivated and to regain freedom of the will again. 
For these reasons, satisfaction, as presented by Frankfurt, seems to be even 
more implausible as a securing element for free will.  
I suggest that a possible reason for this failure is to be found in the incorrect 
relation of dependency that Frankfurt presupposes between volitions of a 
different order. I propose to re-define such a relation by considering the effect 
of the external world on the motivational system of the agents. 
																																																						
because of her second-order volitions, that is, her second-order volitions have, directly or 
indirectly, produced his first-order volitions. 
59 Cfr Frankfurt (1992, 1999, 2004). 
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Let us recall the volitional situation of Susy in the scenario of section 3.2. 
Susy possesses a first order desire to eat junk food. However, she is now 
ambivalent at a higher-level of reflection about whether she wants to be 
motivated by such a desire. In other words, she possesses two opposite and 
conflicting higher-order volitions: she wants to keep desiring junk food because 
she loves and enjoys it; at the same time, she wants to desire to eat healthier 
foods because she is seriously concerned about her health. Now, Susy is able in 
the end to take a step to resolve the ambivalence by favouring the higher-order 
volition of desiring healthy food. How is it possible for such a volition to 
become wholehearted and hence effective in moving Susy to act without any 
voluntaristic effort on the agent’s part, if such a volition is not at the moment part 
of the volitional identity of the agent and she is not fully satisfied with it? 
I propose to understand the role of higher-order volitions in this picture as 
directing our attention to some features of the external word which are coherent 
with that second-order volition. In the case of Susy, for example, her higher-
order volition to desire healthy food directs her attention in the external world 
to circumstances related to her volition: she reads about the relation between 
health and food, she buys health magazines, or she talks to people about such 
matters. As a consequence, it may happen that her first-order desires change in 
accordance with that second-order volition. In the example considered, Susy 
can, in the end, develop a first-order desire to eat healthy food as a result of 
influences from the environment and, in so doing, she regains an alignment 
between her higher-order volitions and her first-order desires.  
Crucially, in the picture I am suggesting the causal relation that motivates 
changes in the will of the agent has not to be found among volitions of different 
orders, as in Frankfurt’s proposal. On the contrary, I argue that such a causal 
relation exists between the external world and the will of an agent. Because of this 
relation, it can happen that the first-order desires of an agent change in 
accordance with her second-order volitions, without presupposing a condition 
of internal control between the different orders of volitions. 
It can be useful to dwell a little more into the role that higher-order 
volitions play in my proposal. I am suggesting that the main role of second-
order volitions is not that of securing free will by causing the alignment in the 
will of an agent, but instead that of directing her attention toward different 
features of the external world. As I argued in section 3.3, however, the ability 
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to form second-order volition is grounded in the agents’ ability to care and love. 
In this sense, what guides our attention to the external world is as well 
grounded in our disposition to care. Frankfurt seems to suggest something 
similar when he writes: 
 
His caring about it consists, rather, in the fact that he guides himself by 
reference to it. This entails that he purposefully direct his attention, 
attitudes, and behavior in response to circumstances germane to the 
fortunes of the object about which he cares.  
(Frankfurt 1993, 110-11) 
 
However, what is missing in Frankfurt’s proposal is an explanation of how 
a fully-fledged notion of freedom can be guaranteed according to a satisfaction 
model. 
My proposal, in this respect, seems to be more promising in explaining 
how changes in caring shape the agent’s will and, at the same time, ground the 
agent’s freedom. Indeed, an important feature of my proposal is that it does not 
presuppose any “deliberate volitional control” from the agents to change the 
configuration of their will. What an agent needs is simply to be wholeheartedly 
satisfied, according to (Def. 4.1), with the new configuration of her will. When 
she is, she possesses a free will. 
At the same time, however, the agent is not a “passive bystander” to her 
own volitional situation: by means of favouring an higher-order volition or 
simply entertaining it in her mind, the agent plays an active role in influencing 
the effective configuration of her will. What happens next, however, is just the 
result of the agent’s spontaneous disposition to care for certain things instead 
of others.  
 
 
3.7 A role for practical reason 
 
  In this section, I advance a proposal about the role of practical reason in a 
hierarchical theory of freedom. The role of practical reason in agency is the 
subject of an extensive debate, which is naturally interrelated with hierarchical 
theories of motivation. In his late works, Frankfurt started taking this literature 
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into account, trying to carefully situate his position in the debate (See for 
example Frankfurt 1999b, and, especially, 2004). I cannot hope to deal with this 
subject satisfactorily in this dissertation. What I offer in this section, however, 
is the starting point of a line of argument which shows that reasons can have a 
place in a hierarchical theory of freedom. 
In the last section, I proposed to understand higher-order volitions as 
directing our attention to some features of the external word which are coherent 
with those second-order volitions. But in which way do higher-order volitions 
direct the agent’s attention toward the external world? My tentative hypothesis 
is that what we care about, in terms of higher-order volitions, directs our 
attention to the external world by providing practical reasons upon which agents 
reflect. My claim, in a nutshell, is that practical reasons are the effective tool 
through which higher-order desires contribute to shaping the agent’s will. In 
the remainder of the section, I will try to provide a sketch of such proposal. 
I begin by asking what is the role of practical reasoning. One plausible 
answer to this question is that agents make use of practical reason, through 
deliberation, to make up their mind about how to reach a particular goal that 
they desire to reach. In so doing, the agent is lead to assess her motivational 
situation, by reflecting on her own motives and reasons in a practical way. In 
this respect, practical reason helps to figure out what is the best way to reach a 
specific end. It is a fundamental aspect of Frankfurt’s proposal, however, that 
such a picture of practical reason, if not incorrect, is at least incomplete. 
Practical reason alone is not able to fulfil this role. Indeed, according to 
Frankfurt, to explain the agent’s ability to reflectively evaluate her situation, 
one has to take into account the effect of the volitional level of the agent, that 
is, what the agent desires or cares about the most. 
The former view of practical reason is shared, for example, by Michael 
Bratman. According to Bratman, even if identification, as Frankfurt 
understands it, needs not involve a commitment to forms of practical 
reasoning, it is plausible to think that the appeal to it is fundamental in 
explaining our agency. In this sense, there should be in the agent’s motivational 
system a phenomenon that is able to account for the role of practical reason. 
Let us look at Bratman’s solution to this problem. Bratman proposes to 
interpret Frankfurt’s claim that “the agent identifies with first-order desire D 
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as functioning as an effective motive” in a way that takes into account practical 
reason and deliberation:  
 
(1) The agent endorses her treating D as providing a justifying reason for 
action in motivationally effective practical reasoning. 
 
In this sense, a person is identified with a desire D if: (i) she treats it as 
reason-giving, (ii) she does not treat it as external, and (iii) she would decide to 
continue to treat it as reason-giving, be satisfied with that decision, and 
continue to treat it as reason-giving if she were to reflect on the matter (cf. 
Bratman 2002). 
Bratman emphasises that satisfaction with a desire is a crucial element of 
human agency. However, he thinks that this concept is not enough to explain 
agency, if it is not paired with that of practical reason. In this sense, he claims 
that one is not simply satisfied with a desire but with treating it as reason-
giving and continuing to treat it that way. That is, satisfaction is justified and 
grounded in a further phenomenon: that of treating a desire as a reason. 
One obvious objection to Bratman’s account is that he seems to treat the 
concept of deciding to treat as reason-giving as a primary concept, in the spirit 
of Frankfurt’s (1987) proposal about decision. In this sense, it is not clear if the 
introduction of a further phenomenon such as the one of “deciding to treat a 
desire as reason-giving” could count as a sufficient ground for the notion of 
identification, or if it is, instead, subject to the same kind of objections that have 
been raised against Frankfurt’s notion of decision.60 Here, I will not attempt a 
detailed discussion of Bratman’s account. Nonetheless, as a general remark, I 
would like to emphasise that the overall spirit of Bratman’s proposal is very 
distant from Frankfurt’s conception of the will and its relation to practical 
reason.  
Frankfurt decisively rejects Bratman’s normative interpretation of his 
claim that “the agent endorses a desire as a legitimate candidate for 
satisfaction.” For Frankfurt, the higher-order attitudes that are formed in 
processes leading to identification “involve ‘evaluations’ only in a sense that is 
																																																						
60 Bratman himself is aware of such a risk, and in 1996 he tries to argue why this is not the 
case. (“But what does it mean to treat a desire as reason-giving? Is it, in short, to identify with 
that desire? Are we moving in a circle?” (9). Also, cf. chapter 2, section 2.3 and 2.4 for a 
discussion of the objections to Frankfurt’s notion of identification. 
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strictly value neutral” (Frankfurt 2002, 87). Frankfurt (1999) seems to sketch a 
possible link between the volitional level of the agent and her practical 
reasoning which goes in a very different direction. Indeed, he suggests that: 
 
The immediacy of the linkage between loving and what counts as a reason 
for doing things that help the beloved is part of what essentially constitutes 
loving. A person will not take the fact that a certain action would fulfill a 
duty as a reason for performing that action unless the person has a desire to 
do what duty demands… His taking it as a reason for performing the 
action is not the outcome of an inference… His taking it as a reason is a 
constitutive aspect of his loving: to love a person is essentially (in part) to 
take the fact that a certain action would be helpful to that person as a 
reason for performing it.  
(Frankfurt 1999b, 176) 
 
Frankfurt’s interesting suggestion here is that an essential component of 
the dispositions of caring and loving is that of providing the agent who cares 
about something with reasons to care. Therefore, the effect of practical reasons 
on the agent’s motivational situation depends on the fact that such reasons 
essentially desires of the agent, because they are provided by her spontaneous 
disposition to care about things. Otherwise, the agent would not be interested 
in that reason and such a reason would not be effective on her will.61 
I argue that such a suggestion is not taken into account by a proposal such 
as Bratman’s, which considers the phenomenon of deciding to treat a desire as 
a reason as the ultimate ground for identification. On the contrary, I propose a 
role for practical reason that is more in line with the spirit of Frankfurt’s 
proposal. I am arguing that what we care about, in terms of higher-order 
volitions, directs our attention to the external world. In doing this, our 
volitional disposition to care provides us, at the same time, with practical 
reasons upon which agents reflect. In other words, higher-order volitions 
provide reasons for agents to ‘make up their mind’ and reflect about their 
motivational system.  
However, this does not imply that the agent exercises any act of decision 
about her desires, or that practical reasons, as a separate element in the agent’s 
																																																						
61 For further criticisms of Frankfurt’s conception of reason see also Scanlon (2002) and Moran 
(2002). 
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motivation, have a causal efficacy on the agent’s will. On the contrary, in my 
proposal they fulfil their role exactly because they are, at the same time, the 
expression of desires of the agent: what the agent cares about is essentially 
presented to the agent herself in the form of practical reasons for caring about 
something in a certain way. In this light, even if reasons do not fulfil any 
separate role with respect to the agent’s will, their role is quite fundamental: 
they are a helpful tool for the agent to participate in the process of deliberation 
and to shape her effective will. 
 
 
3.8 Manipulated and addicted agents 
 
In this section, I take into account objection (c) (cf. section 3.2), which says 
that it is not clear how to handle cases of manipulation and addiction under 
(Def.4.1).  
Let us first consider the problem of manipulation. The manipulation 
objection is a classical worry about hierarchical theories of free will. In its 
general form, it says that it is possible that the alignment in a person’s will 
could be the result of a manipulation, rather than being the result of the 
organisation of the agent’s will. In other words, it is possible to imagine that 
the ‘correct mesh’ of will and volitions, which is responsible for free will, could 
be implanted in a person from an external source.62  
Consider the example, presented by Mele (1995), of two agents, Ann and 
Beth. Until a certain moment, they are two different persons, with different 
psychological structures. After a certain time, however, a neuroscientist 
implants in Beth a psychological structure which is identical to the one that 
Ann has acquired on her own. At such a point, there is no difference as regards 
to the structure of the wills of the two agents. But if this is conceivable, then if 
Ann acts on her own free will, Beth, who acts exactly in the same way, acts in 
a freely willed way too. However, such a result seems strongly counter-
intuitive: if Beth’s will is the result of a neurological manipulation, how can the 
actions that issue from her will be freely willed? 
																																																						
62 For different perspectives on the manipulation-objection see Fischer (1994), Kane, (2002b), 
Pereboom (2001) and van Inwagen (1983). 
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 I argue that (Def. 4.1) is able to distinguish between the two cases and help 
us in dealing with problems of manipulation. (Def. 4.1) suggests that a person’s 
will is free when she is satisfied with her identification with elements of her 
psychic system which belong to her volitional identity. In other words, the 
volitional identity marks a criterion for internality for the agent’s desires: when 
they are part of the agent’s volitional identity, they are internal to the agent’s 
will. Accordingly, (Def.4.1) suggests that in addition to the agent's being 
satisfied with a desire, the latter must also originate from the agent's volitional 
identity for her to identify with it and exercising free will. 
By looking back at Mele’s example, it is clear that Ann’s desires are part of 
her volitional identity: as such, they are good candidates to be considered freely 
willed. On the contrary, one can wonder if Beth’s desires, which have been 
implanted in her will by a neuroscientist, are as well part of her volitional 
identity. 
It seems to me that the way in which the volitional identity of an agent is 
formed strongly discourages the interpretation of Beth’s desires as part of her 
volitional essence. As I argued in section 3.4, the volitional identity of an agent 
is gradually shaped by her spontaneous disposition to care about things. By 
caring and loving over time about different things, indeed, the boundaries of 
the agent’s will are gradually and spontaneously formed and, as such, they 
determine in that particular moment which desires are part of the volitional 
identity of the agent (and are, as such, internal to her will), and which in 
contrast are not (and are, as such, external and alien to the agent’s volitional 
structure).  
A first reply to Mele’s case, then, can be that Beth’s desires are not free 
because they are not formed over time by her natural disposition to care about 
things. On the contrary, indeed, they are implanted in her motivational 
structure by an external intervention, namely, the one of the evil neurosurgeon. 
Accordingly, Beth’s desires seem to be non-free under (Def. 4.1), which states 
that a desire is free if it originates from the agent's volitional identity. However, 
imagine now that the evil neurosurgeon does not manipulate Beth’s will in a 
single time, but instead that he implants Ann’s psychological structure in Beth 
slowly and over time, until the motivational situations of the two agents 
perfectly coincide. We may ask: in such a scenario, are Beth’s desires freely 
willed? 
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To answer this question, I suggest looking at yet another feature of 
volitional identity, namely that it is usually formed spontaneously from the 
agent’s natural disposition to care about different things. It seems to me that 
the desires which derive from a manipulation are not part of the normal 
psychological development of the agent’s will in the spontaneous way just 
described and, as such, they do not satisfy this criterion. For this reason, Beth’s 
desires, even if actually identical to Ann’s desires, are not part of her volitional 
identity: they are not in this respect internal to her will and consequently they 
are not freely willed by the agent. 
 
Let us now consider cases of addiction, by distinguishing between an 
unwilling addict and a willing addict. (Def. 4.1) can easily account for the 
distinction between an unwilling addict and a person who exercises free will. 
The unwilling addict presents conflicts at a higher level with what she wishes 
to be: her action of taking the drug does not issue from a second-order volition 
which is aligned with her will. The unwilling addict, then, is not able to exercise 
free will because there is a discrepancy between her will and her second-order 
volitions. In terms of (Def. 4.1), therefore, the unwilling addict is not satisfied 
with some elements of her psychic system (namely, her desire to take the drug), 
and she is not exercising freedom of the will.  
On the contrary, the condition of satisfaction with one’s own volitions 
closely resembles the status of a willing addict. The willing addict has 
conflicting first-order desires as regards taking a drug. But the second-order 
volitions of the willing addict are in line with her addictive first-order desire to 
take the drug: she wants to take the drug and wants her will to be formed by 
such a desire. Accordingly, under (Def. 4.1) it seems prima facie difficult to 
distinguish between the willing addict and a person who acts on her own free 
will, because the willing addict appears to be wholeheartedly satisfied with her 
motivational situation. The problem is, however, more general: how is it 
possible to distinguish under (Def.4.1) between a desire which is part of the 
volitional identity of the agent and one which is instead generated by an 
addiction?  
The issue is very controversial. However, I think that the best answer to 
this objection for a hierarchical theorist would just be to bite the bullet. I think 
that it is indeed structurally impossible to fully distinguish between addicted 
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desires and free ones.63 Such a distinction is not a clear-cut one, and it is in line 
with my proposal to claim that this is actually the case. One can note that the 
difference between addictive desires and free ones comes in degrees, and in 
some cases (as in the case of Susy’s desire for junk food) it is intrinsically 
difficult from a psychological point of view to judge if a desire is a free or an 
addictive one, and, as a consequence, if it is really part of the volitional identity 
of the agent. The consequence of these remarks, I take it, is that the willing 
addict, under (Def.4.1), is actually exercising free will.  
Such a partial result, however, presents at least an advantage with respect 
to Frankfurt’s original theory of free will. I am going to explain why. In chapter 
1, section 1.5, I argued that the willing addict does not exercise free will under 
Frankfurt’s conditions. By looking back at the different definitions of free will 
found in Frankfurt (1971), Frankfurt seems to think that the willing addict 
exercises freedom of the will according to (Def. 2). On (Def. 2), the willing addict 
is free if she satisfies actual causation, that is, her higher-level motivational 
elements should be in a direct, causal relation with her lower-level ones. At first 
glance, it seems that in the case of the willing addict the causal relation between 
higher-level desires and lower-level desires is not respected, because the 
willing addict’s desire is effective due to her physiological addiction. In this 
light, if the willing addict’s first-order desire for the drug is due to an addiction, 
it is not correct to say that her higher-level desires causally produced her lower-
level ones.  
However, Frankfurt seems to claim the opposite, that is, that when the 
willing addict takes the drug, she “takes it freely and of her own free will.” 
Accordingly, the only way to say that the willing addict exercises free will is to 
claim that the willing addict’s second-level wants do causally produce the first-
level ones. However, to accept this conclusion one has to postulate, as Frankfurt 
does, an overdetermination of the willing addict’s first-order desires to take the 
drug: her desire is effective because she is addicted to the drug but, at the same 
time, it is her effective desire because she wants it to be (Frankfurt 1971, 25).   
																																																						
63 Cf. on this issue Dill & Holton (2014). In this paper, the authors argue that addictive desires 
are not substantially different from non-addictive desires. On their account, what distinguishes 
between them is the way in which they are acquired, which in turn regulate their strength. For 
the authors, one consequence of this account is that the effort to achieve self-control for 
addicted agents is not different in kind from the one needed by non-addicted agents. Rather, it 
differs in degree and difficulty. 
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If, however, one wants to reject the overdetermination strategy, one has to 
conclude, in contrast with Frankfurt’s position, that the willing addict fails to 
exercise free will even according to (Def. 2). By contrast, I showed above that 
the willing addict exercises free will under (Def.4.1) without the need of 
invoking overdetermination, because she is satisfied with her addictive desire 
to take the drug. 
The only way I can think of to show that the willing addict is not exercising 
freedom and that her situation is in a sense different from the one of a free agent 
is to appeal to a ceteris paribus condition. That is, one can claim that an 
addiction, as such, is an element which interrupts the normal psychological 
development of an agent. In this respect, the case of the willing addict 
resembles the one of a manipulated agent. In the psychological development 
of the willing addict, there is a physical impediment to make her non-addicted 
higher-level desires effective in contributing to shaping his will. In this sense, 
one can claim that the willing addict lacks a proper volitional structure to 
secure freedom of the will. 
 
 
3.9 Summary of the chapter 
 
In this chapter, I presented an original hierarchical account of free will.  
Building upon my analysis of Frankfurt’s account of freedom developed in 
chapter 1 and 2, I presented an account which combined the main elements of 
Frankfurt’s original theory (hierarchical levels of desires, identification) with new 
elements from Frankfurt’s late reflection about the psychological structure of 
agents (caring, volitional identity). Accordingly, I advanced a detailed account of 
the psychological structure of agents, and I argued that such a rich structure of 
the will is what grounds my hierarchical account of freedom. 
The main aim of my proposal was to equip a hierarchical theory of free will 
with a different and effective grounding element, the volitional identity of the 
agents. In a nutshell, I suggested that identification as satisfaction can serve as 
the securing element for freedom of the will if it is grounded in the concepts of 
volitional identity and caring. Accordingly, I understood free will as the agent’s 
wholehearted identification with psychic elements which belong to her 
volitional identity (Def. 4.1). 
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With my proposal, I mainly attempted to reply in an effective way to 
Watson-style objections to a hierarchical theory of freedom. According to these 
objections, satisfaction as the mere non-occurrence of negative attitudes toward 
a desire is insufficient to ground identification and free will. I replied to these 
objections by contending that an agent is free when she is identified with a 
desire because such a desire is part of her volitional identity. The agent’s desires can 
ground freedom of the will not simply because, as suggested by Frankfurt, they 
are higher in the hierarchical structure of the will, or because the agent is 
satisfied with them, but because they are part of the agent’s volitional identity. 
Next, I continued to build my proposal by exploring the problem of 
ambivalence in a hierarchical theory of freedom, and I suggested a way to 
overcome this motivational uncertainty according to my account. Moreover, I 
advanced a proposal about the role of practical reason in a hierarchical theory 
of freedom. Finally, I challenged my account by considering cases of 
manipulation and addiction, and I suggested an original solution to these 
problems. 
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4  
Conclusions 
 
 
The following may serve as a summary of the three major claims defended 
in this dissertation: 
 
I. The problem of free will is a problem of grounding. In this 
dissertation, I propose to understand free will in the terms 
suggested by the concept of grounding, and I articulate the relevant 
claims about freedom in such terms. The aim of this shift of 
perspective is to contend that when we deal with the problem of 
free will we are not only looking for necessary and sufficient 
conditions to justify it. What we are mainly interested in are 
elements in virtue of which a choice or an action can be said free. In 
light of this, I describe the main question about freedom as a 
question about which elements ground the ability to exercise free 
will. To ask what grounds freedom of the will, then, means to ask 
what circumstance or condition can make the case that the agent is 
exercising freedom. In other words, when we ask if an agent is 
choosing freely, what we aim to find is one or more conditions in 
virtue of which her choice or an action is a free one.  
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II.  Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory of freedom lacks a proper 
grounding element. I propose an original analysis of Frankfurt’s 
theory of free will and its later developments. The objective of my 
analysis is to show that Frankfurt’s classic hierarchical theory of 
free will is ambiguous between different definitions of freedom, 
and that it does not have the resources to address some very well-
known objections against it. At the same time, I contend that the 
later developments of Frankfurt’s account of freedom, that are 
intended as providing a reply to the objections, are not successful 
in that task. I explore a variety of arguments and theoretical 
alternatives to investigate the outcome of Frankfurt’s theory. My 
main conclusion is that what is essentially missing in Frankfurt’s 
theory of freedom is an effective grounding element, which can 
fully motivate why agents exercise free will according to a 
hierarchical account. As a result, I argue that Frankfurt’s concept 
of freedom is doomed to failure, because it is left without a secure 
grounding element which explains the ability to exercise free will. 
 
III. Volitional identity is the right grounding element for free will. I 
contend that an agent is free when she is identified with a desire 
because such a desire is part of her volitional identity, which is in turn 
shaped by her higher-order reflection about what she cares and 
loves. The agent’s desires can ground freedom of the will not 
simply because they are higher in the hierarchical structure of the 
will, or because the agent is satisfied with them, but because they 
are part of the subject’s volitional identity. For the agent to identify 
with some desires and not with others is, indeed, a kind of 
necessity, a volitional necessity. In light of this, I define free will as 
the agent’s wholehearted identification with psychic elements 
which belong to her volitional identity. 
 
The entire landscape of issues in the domains of freedom of the will, 
philosophy and psychology of action and motivation and related metaphysical 
issues is immense. Developing my original analysis and proposal in this 
dissertation necessarily involved ignoring, or only tangentially addressing, a 
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great number of important topics which would also have deserved serious 
attention. I hope, nonetheless, that this work might at least contribute to 
shedding light on some of the old problems in these domains. 
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